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A B S T R A C T
Due to their ability to capture attention, emotional stimuli tend to benefit from enhanced perceptual processing,
which can be helpful when such stimuli are task-relevant but hindering when they are task-irrelevant. Altered
emotion-attention interactions have been associated with symptoms of affective disturbances, and emerging
research focuses on improving emotion-attention interactions to prevent or treat affective disorders. In line with
the Human Affectome Project’s emphasis on linguistic components, we also analyzed the language used to de-
scribe attention-related aspects of emotion, and highlighted terms related to domains such as conscious
awareness, motivational effects of attention, social attention, and emotion regulation. These terms were dis-
cussed within a broader review of available evidence regarding the neural correlates of (1) Emotion-Attention
Interactions in Perception, (2) Emotion-Attention Interactions in Learning and Memory, (3) Individual Differences in
Emotion-Attention Interactions, and (4) Training and Interventions to Optimize Emotion-Attention Interactions. This
comprehensive approach enabled an integrative overview of the current knowledge regarding the mechanisms of
emotion-attention interactions at multiple levels of analysis, and identification of emerging directions for future
investigations.
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1. Introduction and basic notions
Decades of research have shown that emotional stimuli can benefit
from enhanced perceptual processing due to their ability to capture
attention, and through such prioritized processing they also impact
other cognitive processes. For instance, emotional stimuli are better
encoded and remembered and can also be powerful distracters when
task-irrelevant. Moreover, altered processing of emotional material has
been associated with individual differences in various domains of
healthy functioning (sex, personality, age), as well as with symptoms of
affective disturbances, including anxiety and depression. The linguistic
search that builds the foundation of this special issue reflects the cen-
trality of attentional processes in affective experiences. The identified
terms (Supplementary Table 1) can be broadly categorized into do-
mains relating to conscious awareness, motivational effects of attention,
social attention, and emotion regulation. We integrate the discussion of
these terms within a broader review of emerging scientific evidence
regarding emotion-attention interactions. We review evidence in
healthy functioning and alterations observed in clinical conditions, with
a particular emphasis on the associated neural mechanisms. This work
brings together evidence based on various approaches, spanning from
behavioral and lesion to brain imaging and interventions, which are
grouped around the following four main themes: (1) Emotion-Attention
Interactions in Perception, (2) Emotion-Attention Interactions in Learning
and Memory, (3) Individual Differences in Emotion-Attention Interactions,
and (4) Training and Interventions to Optimize Emotion-Attention
Interactions (Fig. 1). A detailed discussion of evidence regarding these
four themes is followed by a brief discussion of related linguistic aspects
(5). Such a comprehensive approach allows for an integrative under-
standing of the available evidence and identification of concrete ave-
nues for future investigations. In the remainder of this introductory
section, we briefly introduce basic concepts that are relevant
throughout the review.
1.1. Emotions vs. feelings
The nature of emotions has been a matter of centuries-long debate
(e.g., Adolphs, 2016; Adolphs and Andler, 2018; Barrett, 2006, 2012,
2017; Ekman, 1999; Hamann, 2012; Kragel and LaBar, 2016; Panksepp,
2007). For instance, on the one hand, proponents of the “basic emo-
tions” view argue that certain emotions (e.g., anger, fear, happiness,
sadness, and disgust) are biologically basic, with each arising from a
specific module in the brain with homology across species (e.g., Ekman,
1999; Tracy and Randles, 2011). On the other hand, proponents of the
“constructionist1” view posit that what the basic emotion theorists call
‘emotions’ are populations of instances (i.e., categories) that do not arise
from their own dedicated neural modules, but instead are constructed
from a combination of activity in domain-general networks of the brain
that perform more basic psychological functions such as salience de-
tection, memory, sensory perception, and language (Barrett, 2006,
2012; Barrett and Satpute, 2013). While definitions of emotion remain
hotly debated (Lindquist et al., 2013; Panksepp, 2007), there is a
general consensus that affective phenomena (the more comprehensive
term) consist of multiple subcomponents including physiological, ap-
praisals, expressions, and behaviors that define the relation between the
individual and environment. From a practical standpoint, a simplistic
dissociation between emotions and feelings that is typically used in
neuroscientific approaches is in terms of physiological vs. psychological
aspects of affective processing (Iversen et al., 2000; LeDoux and Brown,
2017). Namely, while emotions have more to do with bodily responses
(e.g., increased heart rate in a frightening situation), feelings refer to
the associated psychological aspects (e.g., experiencing the feeling of
being afraid) produced by the specific circumstances. Feelings might
therefore be best understood as subjective interpretations of physiolo-
gical responses (Siddharthan et al., 2018). Studies of emotion-attention
interactions have investigated both emotions (including unconscious/
automatic bodily responses) and feelings (relatively more conscious
aspects of emotional responses), which are discussed throughout all
sections of the current review.
1.2. Transient vs. long-term responses
In addition to differentiating between emotions and feelings, it is
also important to consider the duration of affective experiences. What is
commonly referred to as an occurrence of an emotion is transient and
usually concerned with a specific object or situation (Russell and
Barrett, 1999), whereas mood is considered to be much longer-lasting,
diffuse, and less specific (Frijda, 2009). Furthermore, although emo-
tions tend to follow the emotion-eliciting stimuli closely or in-
stantaneously, a mood might be temporally remote from its cause,
making the cause of a mood difficult to identify (Morris, 1992).
Moreover, prolonged emotional responses and moods are also com-
monly observed as symptoms of anxiety, depression, or trauma- and
stress-related disorders, which are characterized by recurrent and in-
trusive thoughts about previous or anticipated distressing or potentially
traumatic events (Dalgleish and Power, 2004). Of particular relevance
for the present review, such symptoms of affective dysregulation have
been associated with deficits in top-down attentional control (Schäfer
et al., 2018). These and other relevant issues are discussed in more
detail in several sections of the present review.
1.3. Valence vs. arousal
These two basic affective dimensions, one referring to the (un)
pleasantness and the other to the intensity of emotional responses, are
commonly used to characterize various forms of affect (Lang et al.,
1993; Russell and Barrett, 1999). Although different models proposed
over time have emphasized either one or the other (Thayer, 1989;
Watson and Tellegen, 1985) of these two dimensions, most current
approaches agree with a bi-dimensional structure, with valence varying
from positive to negative and arousal from high to low (Lang et al.,
1993; Russell and Barrett, 1999). In the context of experimental ma-
nipulations, valence and arousal may be more difficult to separate be-
cause stimuli used to induce positive and negative emotions typically
also determine a change in arousal (Lindquist et al., 2016). Hence, it is
not only important to examine the role of positive and negative stimuli
in attention and the associated processes, but also to dissociate between
different levels of arousal within the emotional categories, which can be
attained (Shafer et al., 2011).
1.4. Affect vs. motivation
Affective and motivational processes are closely related to one an-
other (Lang and Bradley, 2008; Rolls, 2000), but the two have been
conceptualized as being distinguishable and also different in terms of
their effects on our cognition and behavior (Chiew and Braver, 2011;
Pessoa, 2013). For instance, unlike affective processes, motivation is
more explicitly goal-oriented and is thought to be the driving force for
1 Although this debate on the nature of emotion is not the focus of this
manuscript, it is important to note that current theories of emotion have im-
plications for the treatment of mental disorders in which emotion-attention
interactions are maladaptive (see Section 4.3 below). For instance, a psycho-
logical constructionist approach has been applied as a way of understanding the
mechanisms of PTSD, suggesting that core symptoms of this disorder might
emerge from dysregulation of basic psychological operations or how these
processes influence and constrain each other (Suvak and Barrett, 2011). No-
tably, this approach could be particularly useful in better understanding the
heterogeneity of intrusive and re-experiencing symptoms experienced by PTSD
patients (e.g., Dalgleish, 2004), which might be at least in part due to individual
variations in the combination of dysfunctional psychological “ingredients”
(Suvak and Barrett, 2011).
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actions engaged to accomplish the goals (Pessoa, 2009). In this context,
affective experiences reflect the extent to which the goals are accom-
plished or not (and the associated rewards or punishments are obtained
or avoided, respectively), and can also be experienced in earlier stages -
e.g., during the planning of actions, or in the anticipation of accom-
plishing or failing to accomplish the goals. Similar to the valence di-
mension in affective processes, distinctions are also made between
approach and avoidance motivations, both at the level of temperamental
tendencies (Gray, 1970; Higgins, 1998) and experimentally induced
transient motivational orientations, which differentially modulate at-
tentional flexibility (Calcott and Berkman, 2014; Gable and Harmon-
Jones, 2008). In the present review, the role of motivation is discussed
with respect to the impact of reward on attentional processes, as well as
in the context of emotion-attention interactions in social cognition. It is
Fig. 1. Diagram of emotion-attention interactions discussed in the present manuscript. The figure summarizes domains and levels of emotion-attention
interactions, along with associated neural correlates, based on behavioral, lesion, brain imaging, and intervention studies in healthy and clinical populations. Brain
regions and event-related potentials (ERP) components within the square brackets denote the representative effects for each subsection featured in the manuscript.
The color-coded brain activations in the background depict responses in a dorsal executive neural system (DES) involved in “cold” cognitive/executive processing and
a ventral affective system (VAS) involved in “hot” emotion processing (brain image adapted from Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006). This image is used to suggest that
emotion-attention interactions in the brain occur in the context of interactions between neural systems involved in executive and affective processing. AMY,
amygdala; PFC, prefrontal cortex; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; HC, hippocampus; mMTL, memory-related medial temporal lobe regions; mPFC, medial prefrontal
cortex; vlPFC, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; Ins, insula; pSTS, posterior superior temporal sulcus; EBA, extrastriate body area; DES, dorsal executive system; VAS,
ventral affective system; FPN, fronto-parietal network; SN, salience network; LPP, late positive potential; WM, working memory; EM, episodic memory; PTSD, post-
traumatic stress disorder.
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important, however, to also consider the different ways in which dis-
positional or momentary motivational states (Higgins, 1998; Higgins
et al., 2012; Mischel and Shoda, 1995) can drive affect, attention, and
their interaction (Dweck et al., 2004; Pessoa, 2014; Raymond, 2009).
1.5. Attentional processes
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that researchers have in-
vestigated different types of attentional processes and their interactions
with emotion, although the focus of this review is not to distinguish
between these different types at every level. For instance, a prominent
view in the literature points to the existence of two anatomically and
functionally distinct attentional systems in the brain, subserving top-
down/goal-driven allocation of attention vs. bottom-up/stimulus-
driven attentional processing (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002), both
modulated by emotional information. A notable point highlighted by
the research of these two attentional systems, for example, is that the
interaction between emotion and attention is complex and intertwined,
can go in either direction, and can involve both top-down and bottom-
up processes. Furthermore, researchers have also differentiated be-
tween “selective” attention, characterized by differential processing of
simultaneous sources of information (Johnston and Dark, 1986) and
“sustained” attention, characterized by one’s readiness to detect certain
signals over prolonged periods of time (Sarter et al., 2001). Yet, another
line of research has investigated executive control of attention, or
“executive” attention, defined as detection and resolution of conflict
(Posner et al., 2007). Emotion-attention interactions linked to the
various aspects of attentional processes are discussed throughout all
sections of the current review, from links to early stages of perceptual
processing and the impact on working memory, to their long-term in-
fluences on learning and memory, and linked to the role of individual
differences in healthy and clinical groups, as well as in the context of
training and intervention approaches targeting optimal emotion-atten-
tion interactions.
2. Emotion-attention interactions in perception
2.1. Conscious and unconscious emotion processing
Over the last two decades, research in the field of emotion proces-
sing has seen a rapid rise in interest, particularly with the increased
availability of brain imaging methodologies. Furthermore, with the
emergence of behavioral evidence showing that emotional stimuli can
impinge on behavior after very brief presentations (tens of milli-
seconds), interest has also arisen in identifying and understanding un-
conscious processing of emotional stimuli, thus challenging the domi-
nant idea upheld until then that affect could not occur without
conscious cognitive processing (Zajonc, 1980). Subsequently, using
behavioral measures, as well as brain imaging methodologies in both
healthy controls and brain-damaged patients, a number of investiga-
tions have been carried out to determine the extent of these effects, as
well as their neural substrates. These will be briefly overviewed below
according to the experimental approach used, with a focus on the
processing of emotional expressions.
2.1.1. Behavioral evidence
Numerous behavioral methods are available to disrupt awareness of
the emotional stimuli in healthy participants. Among them, the most
common involve (i) pattern masking procedures, in which the stimulus
is presented very briefly and followed by (or also preceded by) a mask,
and (ii) continuous flash suppression, in which different inputs (one
flashing and one stable) are presented to each eye, consequently in-
terfering with awareness of the stable stimulus (reviewed in Axelrod
et al., 2015). In two original studies, Ӧhman and colleagues (Esteves
et al., 1994; Ӧhman et al., 1989) demonstrated that conditioned angry
faces produced an electrodermal response even when they were
masked, an observation that was later replicated with conditioned
images of spiders and snakes (Ӧhman and Soares, 1993). Elsewhere, it
was found that subliminally presented angry and happy faces primed
the pleasantness ratings of Chinese ideograms (Murphy and Zajonc,
1993), as well as emotional memory (Yang et al., 2011) and produced
shifts in spatial attention towards the threatening faces (Mogg and
Bradley, 1999). Although masking thresholds appear to differ between
individuals (Pessoa et al., 2005), evidence of emotional expressions has
also been found with other techniques including sandwich masking
(Stein et al., 2014).
2.1.2. Lesion evidence
Focal brain lesions provide a different source of evidence for emo-
tion processing outside of conscious awareness. Some of the most
compelling demonstrations stem from work by de Gelder et al. (1999),
who were the first to report that blindsight (residual visual processing
in patients with blindness due to damage to the visual cortex) extended
to emotional expressions. Investigating a patient with right hemianopia
(blindness in the right visual field), the authors found that when
emotionally expressive faces were presented to his blind field, he per-
formed above chance when guessing what the expression was. This
affective form of blindsight revealed that the emotional information
present on a face could be processed despite cortical blindness and thus
in the absence of any conscious visual experience. Further evidence of
affective blindsight was later found in another patient with bilateral
visual cortex damage and complete blindness, who also demonstrated
above-chance performance when guessing the emotional expressions on
faces (Pegna et al., 2005). Functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) recordings of this individual revealed the presence of right
amygdala (AMY) activation when viewing faces with different emo-
tional expressions.
Interestingly, affective blindsight is not restricted to facial expres-
sions, but is also observed for emotional body expressions (de Gelder
and Hadjikhani, 2006). Another patient, also suffering from bilateral
cortical blindness, demonstrated the acoustic startle response to a
conditioned visual stimulus that had been paired with an unpleasant
electric shock (Hamm et al., 2003). Similar effects were observed in a
separate fMRI study performed on a hemianopic patient, who showed
AMY activity in response to unseen fearful faces and fear-conditioned
stimuli (Morris et al., 2001). A particularly important point to highlight
is that, in this hemianopic patient, activity in the superior colliculus and
pulvinar was correlated to that in the right AMY, as has also been ob-
served in healthy controls (see below). This suggests that affective
blindsight could rely on a colliculo-pulvinar pathway to the AMY, as a
neural substrate for unconscious processing of emotional stimuli. Fi-
nally, other approaches have corroborated the existence of unconscious
processing of emotional faces and bodies, in particular using measures
such as saccadic eye-movements towards unseen stimuli in the blind
field (Bannerman et al., 2010), interhemispheric summation (Bertini
et al., 2013), or physiological motor responses including pupil dilata-
tion and facial reactions, thought to reflect the emotional response to
the unseen, yet processed stimuli (Tamietto et al., 2009).
Finally, evidence consistent with this idea also comes from research
on patients with lesions in other brain regions, such as the parietal
cortex. Lesions of the parietal lobe are known to produce attentional
deficits, such as unilateral spatial neglect, while the primary visual
regions continue to process basic information (Rees et al., 2000). Here,
too, despite the inability of patients to report stimuli in the neglected or
extinguished field, numerous findings have demonstrated that a certain
degree of unconscious processing of emotional information does occur
(Vuilleumier and Schwartz, 2001). Namely, patients generally do not
report the stimuli presented in the contralesional (left) field, except
when they were composed of emotional faces (see also Pegna et al.,
2008a). These findings suggest that emotional stimuli (typically faces)
have an overriding effect on the attentional deficit, thus indicating a
certain degree of pre-attentive processing. As also discussed in the next
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section, structures underlying this unconscious emotional face proces-
sing have been further explored using a similar task while brain ima-
ging data were recorded (Vuilleumier et al., 2002), and point to the role
of both subcortical and cortical brain areas in pre-attentive emotion
processing.
2.1.3. Brain imaging evidence
Further evidence for unconscious emotion processing has come from
research capitalizing on brain imaging approaches such as fMRI and
electroencephalography (EEG)/event-related potentials (ERP) in-
vestigations (see Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010 for a review). Consistent
with evidence from lesion studies, early fMRI research helped to loca-
lize brain regions that are important for emotion processing by capi-
talizing on the high spatial resolution of the technique. Research in this
area established the AMY as a critical component for emotional face
processing in humans, particularly for fearful expressions (Adolphs
et al., 1994; Whalen et al., 2001). Presenting masked fearful and happy
faces, Whalen et al. (1998) observed increases in AMY activity for
fearful compared to happy faces. Interestingly, in a subsequent study
(Whalen et al., 2004), the authors observed that the masked whites of
the eye were sufficient to produce the AMY response. Using an aversive
learning procedure, Morris et al. (1998) also found evidence of AMY
activation for unseen, negative stimuli that were paired with an aver-
sive noise. Subsequent analyses revealed increased connectivity be-
tween the right AMY and pulvinar and superior colliculus, for non-seen
fear-conditioned faces, again substantiating the notion that a colliculo-
pulvinar pathway to the AMY likely mediates emotion processing in the
absence of awareness (Morris et al., 1999). AMY activation for non-
conscious emotional processing has since been repeatedly confirmed
using subliminal masking (e.g., Liddell et al., 2005), as well as bino-
cular rivalry (Williams et al., 2004), confirming its ability to process
emotions in the absence of awareness.
Evidence from EEG/ERP studies provided further insight into the
timing of these phenomena, by capitalizing on the high temporal re-
solution of the technique to examine the brain responses to subliminal
emotional faces. Although EEG/ERP has relatively low spatial resolu-
tion compared to fMRI, it allows for highly accurate characterization of
the time course involved in high-level cognitive functioning, within the
first second after the stimulus onset (Wilding and Ranganath, 2011).
This technique has been shown to be a highly suitable tool to study the
temporal dynamics involved in emotion-cognition interactions (Luck,
2005), whereas fMRI is well suited for studying spatial dynamics of the
brain but has relatively low temporal resolution, making the two
techniques complementary in this respect (Moore et al., 2019). In the
ERP domain, increased N170 responses are associated with face pro-
cessing (Allison et al., 1999; Stekelenburg and de Gelder, 2004). The
N170 refers to a negative deflection in the occipito-temporal sensors of
the ERP signal occurring around 130–200ms post-stimulus onset. and is
one of the most studied ERP components2 in social, affective, and
cognitive neurosciences to date (Botzel and Grusser, 1989; Eimer,
2011). Facial emotional expressions are processed in early ERP com-
ponents, between 100 and 200ms (in particular the N170) for fearful
faces (e.g., Stekelenburg and de Gelder, 2004), as well as for other
emotional expressions (Batty and Taylor, 2003; Hendriks et al., 2007).
Furthermore, similar time periods were reported for the processing of
emotional body expressions (Stekelenburg and de Gelder, 2004), as
well as naked bodies (Hietanen and Nummenmaa, 2011) and their
perceived attractiveness (Del Zotto and Pegna, 2017) (see also Section
2.4 for a discussion of N170 related to face and body perception). In
parallel with these observations, studies examining the time course of
masked, subliminal, emotional faces reported differences between
fearful and neutral faces in the 140–180ms time windows (Pegna et al.,
2011, Pegna et al., 2008b). Together, these findings highlight the N170
as an example of brain responses that appear to be sensitive to emo-
tional, social, and cognitive processing, including during masking,
which makes it a useful target for investigating multiple aspects of
emotion-attention interactions.
Unconscious emotion processing has been proposed to be an artefact
of incomplete masking (Pessoa et al., 2005), and thus it was again ar-
gued that fearful faces may not actually be processed automatically and
non-consciously, and that previous results may be explained by the fact
that awareness was not sufficiently controlled (Pessoa et al., 2006).
Counterarguments to this idea have risen when considering situations
where either awareness was impeded by orienting attention away from
the emotional stimuli, thus precluding detection, or the emotional sti-
mulation was not powerful enough (Vuilleumier et al., 2001). More-
over, as described below, results from a more recent investigation
(Shafer et al., 2012) provide evidence reconciling the opposing views
(see work by Vuilleumier et al. vs. Pessoa et al.) regarding the debate
about the automaticity of emotion processing, by demonstrating that
processing of emotional information is both automatic and modulated
by attention (Shafer et al., 2012).
Overall, although some degree of controversy remains, the available
behavioral, lesion, and functional neuroimaging evidence strongly
supports the view that the processing of emotional information in hu-
mans can occur without awareness. The entire network involved in
these processes may not yet have been completely identified, but it
appears that the AMY plays an important part in its implementation.
Despite evidence suggesting an early time course for the processing of
emotional stimuli under conditions of conscious and unconscious
viewing, the link between these early differences and AMY activation
remain to be determined. Another element that remains unclear is the
diversity of emotional stimuli that might be processed without aware-
ness. Although faces have been used in a large majority of investiga-
tions, other stimuli, such as body expressions, have recently begun to be
studied (see de Gelder et al., 2010 for a review on this topic), and other
types of emotional stimuli may likely also be processed unconsciously.
For example, there has been a growing body of work on the link be-
tween motivation and attention in the context of conscious and un-
conscious processing of reward (Bourgeois et al., 2016). However, an
additional challenge for this research area is that the paradigms used
tend to have stimuli that predict reward and have an inherent value of
motivational significance in the task itself. Section 2.3 provides more
details on the links between reward and attentional processes. One last
crucial point of discussion concerns the pathways leading to AMY ac-
tivation, in the context of unconscious processing. As alluded to above,
one influential hypothesis has suggested that unconscious processing of
emotional stimuli may arise through a subcortical pathway to the AMY,
which involves the superior colliculus and the pulvinar (LeDoux, 2012).
Although evidence is emerging supporting the existence of this pathway
both functionally (e.g., Garrido et al., 2012) and anatomically
(Tamietto et al., 2012), its existence remains highly debated (de Gelder
et al., 2011; Pessoa and Adolphs, 2010) and is yet to be resolved.
The wealth of evidence accumulated to date confirms the validity of
nonconscious processing, and arguably, most emotional and cognitive
processes generally occur outside of awareness. What remains unclear
is whether unconscious processes reflect weak(er) but comparable
modes of brain function to conscious ones, or whether the two modes of
processing are distinct, which is a question akin to whether con-
sciousness is a graded or an all-or-none phenomenon (e.g., Overgaard
and Mogensen, 2014; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004). While still an open
2 Here, and in Section 2.4 below, we focus our discussion on N170 responses
in the context of examining conscious and unconscious processing of social-
affective stimuli (i.e., faces and bodies). It is important to note, however, that
available evidence demonstrates that N170 can also be modulated by other
factors, such as expectations. For instance, greater N170 responses have been
associated with processing of deviant faces, suggesting that this ERP component
reflects at least in part a prediction error signal in social perception (Johnston
et al., 2016). Given its sensitivity to both bottom-up stimulus features and top-
down goal relevance, the N170 seems to play broad roles in social, affective,
and cognitive processes associated with emotion-attention interactions.
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question, the fact that evidence appears to favor the latter (e.g.,
Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Williams et al., 2006) strongly justifies
maintaining this area as an independent field of investigation.
2.2. Emotional distraction and perception
2.2.1. Emotion-attention interactions in the impact of distraction on
perception
An important factor in determining the impact of emotion on per-
ception and attention is whether emotional stimuli serve as targets
(task-relevant) or distracters (task-irrelevant). When an emotional sti-
mulus is task-relevant, the prioritization of processing resources for
affective information results in task-enhancement, whereas when it is
task-irrelevant, emotion processing can lead to depletion of resource
availability and result in task-impairment (Dolcos et al., 2011; Iordan
et al., 2013b). This was also the case in the studies discussed above
leading to opposing views regarding the automaticity of emotional
processing vs. its dependence on the availability of processing re-
sources. A recent investigation provided reconciling evidence regarding
the automaticity of emotion processing (Shafer et al., 2012), by ma-
nipulating both aspects of controversy identified by previous research.
Specifically, this study investigated the impact of emotional distraction
on performance in a shape discrimination task, by manipulating both (i)
the degree of emotional charge of the distracting information (from
highly to absolute neutral) and (ii) the attentional demands of the main
cognitive task, by varying the task difficulty (low vs. high perceptual
load) and the time of presentation (short vs. long duration). Behavioral
findings revealed impaired performance by emotional distraction re-
flected in longer reaction times (RTs) for negative than for neutral
items, regardless of manipulations of attentional demands. However,
the detrimental effect of emotional distraction was strongest when the
difference in emotional content was the greatest (highly emotional vs.
absolute neutral comparison) and the attentional resources were most
available (low load).
These findings are consistent with the idea that processing of
emotional information can be both automatic (when emotional stimuli
are powerful) and susceptible to attentional modulation (when pro-
cessing resources are low). Paralleling these behavioral effects, and
consistent with the traditional view regarding the automaticity of
emotion processing (Vuilleumier, 2005), activity in basic emotion-re-
lated regions (e.g., AMY) was found in response to emotional stimuli,
regardless of manipulations of attentional demands. However, the en-
gagement of higher-level (cortical) emotion processing regions (i.e.,
medial prefrontal cortex [mPFC] and ventrolateral PFC [vlPFC])
showed susceptibility to modulation by attention, with increased en-
gagement when attentional resources were most available and there
was more time to perform the task (Shafer and Dolcos, 2012). Hence,
depending on the circumstances, emotional information can be pro-
cessed automatically and is also susceptible to modulations linked to
the availability of attentional resources. Overall, these findings pro-
vided reconciling evidence regarding the automaticity of emotion
processing, which has been the focus of a long-lasting debate in the
literature (Pessoa, 2013; Vuilleumier, 2005).
2.2.2. Emotion-attention interactions linking the impact of distraction on
perception and episodic memory
Attention-perception interactions affect not only initial perception
but can also have long-term consequences on memory (see also the
section on learning and memory). Specifically, emerging evidence
suggests that emotional distraction has opposing immediate vs. long-
term effects, which are influenced by attentional modulation. Such
evidence provides neural support for opposing effects of emotion in
real-life situations, where task-irrelevant emotional information (e.g.,
the scene of a tragic accident while driving) may temporarily distract us
from the main task (e.g., driving), while also leading to better memory
for the distracting information (e.g., the crashed vehicles). Task-
irrelevant emotional distracters can impair ongoing cognitive proces-
sing (e.g., perceptual), while also leading to enhancement of memory
for the distracters themselves (Shafer and Dolcos, 2012). Importantly,
this study provides evidence that immediate/impairing and long-term/
enhancing effects of emotional distraction are differentially influenced
by the availability of processing resources. Specifically, while the
strongest immediate impairment of emotional distraction occurred
when processing load was low, and thus there were more processing
resources available, the strongest enhancement of episodic memory for
the emotional distracters occurred when processing resources were
least available (high load).
At the neural level, the dissociation between these two opposing
effects was observed in both basic AMY-hippocampus (HC) mechanisms
and in higher-order cognitive brain regions (mPFC and parietal cortex).
Specifically, the results point to a possible hemispheric dissociation
identified in the AMY−HC mechanisms, with bilateral engagement for
the impairing effect and left-sided engagement for the memory en-
hancement by emotion. This finding can be linked to evidence sug-
gesting greater engagement of the left AMY in more elaborative pro-
cessing of the emotional stimuli, which also contributes to enhanced
memory (Glascher and Adolphs, 2003; Phelps et al., 2001). Outside of
the MTL, the mPFC was associated only with the immediate/impairing
effect on perception, whereas the superior parietal cortex was asso-
ciated only with the long-term/enhancing effect on memory. Given that
mPFC is sensitive to emotional stimuli (Keightley et al., 2003) and the
superior parietal cortex is part of the dorsal attentional network
(Corbetta and Shulman, 2002), the contribution of these regions to the
opposing effects can be attributed to increased emotional and atten-
tional processing of the distracters, respectively (Shafer and Dolcos,
2012).
2.3. The role of reward in attentional processes
The vast majority of evidence regarding emotion-attention interac-
tions capitalizes on the impact of negative emotional responses, pro-
duced by stimuli with powerful motivational significance. However,
positive motivation is also an effective way to induce and sustain goals,
and thus promote goal-directed attention – e.g., when participants are
told that they will receive reward for correct performance or when a
stimulus predicts future rewards (Braver, 2016). Similar to negative
emotional information, stimuli associated with reward or signaling
potential future reward (or loss of reward) can also contribute to dis-
traction, if such signals are incongruent with the task at hand (Anderson
et al., 2013). Here, we discuss the influence of reward on attentional
processes, underlying neural substrates, and associations with behavior.
A growing number of studies have shown that incentives or positive
reinforcement (i.e., gaining monetary or other forms of reward for
correct performance) improve accuracy (Gilbert and Fiez, 2004) and
performance in cognitive tasks (Krawczyk et al., 2007). Such im-
provements are thought to be associated with the effects of reward on
the deployment of attentional resources. Some researchers have argued
that reward influences attention by improving the quality of sensory
coding, as it mobilizes attentional resources in ways that can promote
access to better representation of the information (Hübner and
Schlösser, 2010). According to the dual mechanisms of control frame-
work (Braver, 2012), the use of incentives is thought to improve task
performance by increasing proactive control (i.e., preparatory control
aimed at preventing conflict and optimizing task performance) through
sustained activation of task-relevant information. For instance, Chiew
and Braver (2016) reported that task-informative cues in the flanker
task, signaling whether an upcoming trial was incongruent, could re-
duce interference, but only when cues were paired with rewards and
there was sufficient preparation time (Chiew and Braver, 2016). How-
ever, there is also evidence that reward can increase reactive control
(i.e., rapid adjustment of control in response to performance mon-
itoring), such as speeding up response inhibition in a stop-signal task
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that does not include preparatory cues (Boehler et al., 2014).
Studies focused on attentional control or conflict processing report
reduced conflict during the reward versus no-reward condition as in-
dexed by more accurate and faster reaction times (Padmala and Pessoa,
2011). Specifically, Padmala and Pessoa reported reward cue-related
responses in subcortical regions (including striatal - nucleus accumbens,
caudate, putamen - and ventral tegmental area) and fronto-parietal
attentional regions. Interestingly, they showed that activation in these
fronto-parietal regions was predictive of reduced conflict-related sig-
nals in the mPFC during the target phase of the task. They also reported
findings from path analyses suggesting that a relationship between the
right intraparietal sulcus (IPS) (during reward cue) and the mPFC
(during target) was mediated by neural responses in the left fusiform
gyrus (FG) (during target). Such findings support the notion that reward
can ‘upregulate’ attentional control and that such upregulation depends
on how reward-related subcortical regions interact with fronto-parietal
regions important for the control of attention (Padmala and Pessoa,
2011).
Reward could also impede performance on cognitive tasks by
modulating early attentional processes in ways that would impair the
ability to maintain task representations and reduce goal-directed at-
tention necessary for optimal task performance (Anderson and Sali,
2016). Numerous recent studies have provided evidence that when
visual features of a stimulus are associated with a reward outcome, they
acquire high priority and can automatically capture visual attention
(e.g., Anderson et al., 2013). Such attentional capture is also dependent
upon the individual’s learning history (Anderson, 2017). Learning
which stimulus or object is more likely to predict a reward outcome of
high value (e.g., money, food, positive social feedback from peers)
creates reward-related attentional biases that can override goal-di-
rected attention. As demonstrated by a series of experiments, the cap-
ture of attention by a neutral, task-irrelevant distracter, which had been
previously associated with monetary reward, was associated with the
slowing of RTs to a shape target (Anderson et al., 2011). ERP studies
revealed that non-contingent reward cues modulate the amplitude of
ERPs associated with cortical activity in early visual areas, indicating
that such cues might alter the properties of perception (Hickey et al.,
2010). Findings from neuroimaging studies suggest the involvement of
‘value-driven attention network’ implicated in reward-related atten-
tional capture, which includes striatal regions, such as the caudate, as
well as sub-regions of the visual cortex, and the IPS (Anderson and Sali,
2016).
Finally, the development of fronto-striatal networks is an important
factor to consider regarding the influence of reward on attention. Such
influences could be attributed to the age-related peak in reward and
sensation-seeking behaviors (Steinberg et al., 2009), sensitivity to
monetary incentives (Galvan et al., 2006), and other forms of reward
(Eckstrand et al., 2017). Several neuroimaging studies report elevated
activation of ventral striatum to anticipated reward or appetitive cues
in adolescents compared to adults or children (Galvan, 2010; Geier
et al., 2010). Other studies indicate that the neural systems involved in
integrating motivationally salient information with attentional control
processes, including ventrolateral fronto-striatal networks (Balleine
et al., 2007; Delgado et al., 2004), remain less structurally and func-
tionally mature during the adolescent years (Rubia et al., 2006;
Somerville et al., 2010). Few studies have examined specifically,
however, the influence of reward on attentional processes, and the
findings are mixed, with some reporting that incentives facilitate ado-
lescent cognitive control (Padmanabhan et al., 2011), and others re-
porting reduced effects compared to adults (Castel et al., 2011). Such
findings suggest that neurodevelopmental changes in fronto-striatal
systems may contribute to changes in how reward influences atten-
tional processes.
In summary, numerous studies have shown that reward can enhance
attention in selective ways and that such enhancement can promote
goal-directed attention or capture selective attention in ways that can
impede performance. The neural correlates associated with these effects
involve fronto-striatal interactions, and their developmental trajectory
may influence the effect of reward on attentional processes.
2.4. Emotion-attention-perception interactions in social cognition
2.4.1. Face and body perception
The nature of our interactions with others depends critically on how
we perceive and interpret their emotions, which can also provide in-
sight into intentions and future actions. While these are typically ex-
pressed in both the face and the body, research on perception of emo-
tions in both categories has run asynchronously, with face research
preceding the scientific study of bodies by several decades. Both faces
and bodies convey information about multiple variables including sex,
age, identity, and emotion. As a category of stimuli with high beha-
vioral relevance, processing of body forms has been studied with similar
behavioral and neural methods to faces, and the findings on associated
processing mechanisms turned out remarkably parallel to those of faces.
For instance, both faces and bodies are processed configurally (Reed
et al., 2003; Stekelenburg and de Gelder, 2004), which relates to the
dominance of perception of spatial relations between features over the
perception of the features themselves. This proposed mechanism is ty-
pically investigated by means of the inversion effect, which refers to the
difference in recognition performance of stimuli presented upside-down
compared to stimuli presented in a canonical orientation (upright).
While an inversion effect is not face- or body-specific, it is increased for
faces and bodies compared to other stimulus classes, such as houses or
shoes (Reed et al., 2003; Stekelenburg and de Gelder, 2004).
At the neural level, both faces and bodies are associated with
electrophysiological (ERP) and hemodynamic (fMRI) markers. As re-
viewed above in Section 2.1, in the ERP domain, increased N170 is
typically associated with face processing (Allison et al., 1999;
Stekelenburg and de Gelder, 2004), and is presumed to underlie
structural encoding. Behavioral and EEG studies using a delayed match
to sample task have found an inversion effect for bodies, with a longer
RT for inverted bodies (Reed et al., 2003), and similarly delayed, but
enhanced N170 ERP components for both inverted faces and bodies (de
Gelder et al., 2010; Stekelenburg and de Gelder, 2004). The fMRI-based
research has identified both body- and body parts-specific areas in the
fusiform gyrus (FG), between face sensitive clusters, termed fusiform
body area (FBA), and in the lateral occipital cortex, termed extra-striate
body area (EBA) (Downing et al., 2001; Peelen and Downing, 2007).
For EBA, there is evidence that its activity is modulated not only by
passive perception of bodies, but also by participants’ own unseen
hand- and foot-pointing movements (Astafiev et al., 2004). In addition
to the body-specific EBA and FBA, the posterior superior temporal
sulcus (pSTS) is activated by both bodies and faces, and is also activated
by body motion (Kontaris et al., 2009). Body-specific patches have also
been reported in the STS in non-human primates, partially overlapping
with face-selective patches (de Gelder and Partan, 2009). These patches
had single-cell responses to local fragments of the bodies, which were
frequently but not exclusively present with body stimuli (Popivanov
et al., 2016).
In addition to the information related to visual forms and recogni-
tion, human bodies also convey a much wider range of daily-life actions
than faces. The dorsal stream is more activated by observation of bodies
than by observation of faces, including activation in the action ob-
servation network (e.g. ventral premotor [PMv], middle and anterior
parietal sulcus). The functions of PMv and EBA in body perception have
been studied using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS).
Stimulating EBA selectively slows the RT for form discrimination, while
stimulating PMv selectively slows the RT for action discrimination
(Urgesi et al., 2007). Emotional information can be conveyed efficiently
by bodies, either depicted with static images or with dynamic video
clips, or even with static or dynamic point-light displays alone (de
Gelder and Van den Stock, 2008; Van den Stock et al., 2015). The
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processing of emotional body cues occurs fast in healthy participants. In
a magnetoencephalography (MEG) study, fearful bodies could be dif-
ferentiated from neutral ones as early as 80ms in parietal areas (Meeren
et al., 2016). Emotional bodies often provide contextual information for
processing other modalities such as faces, voices, and scenes, and in-
terfere with them, but perception of emotional bodies can also be in-
fluenced by these kinds of contextual information (e.g., Van den Stock
and de Gelder, 2012; Van den Stock et al., 2014).
Notably, emotional bodies activate the AMY presumably in inter-
action with body-specific areas - i.e. EBA, FBA, and pSTS (e.g.,
Hadjikhani and de Gelder, 2003; Pichon et al., 2012), similar to emo-
tional faces recruiting the AMY and face-specific areas. Interestingly,
threatening scenes also activate the EBA (Sinke et al., 2012b). Emo-
tional bodies recruit action processing areas including the premotor
cortex and emotion-related areas including the temporo-parietal junc-
tion (TPJ), temporal pole, and orbitofrontal cortex (e.g., Kret et al.,
2011; Pichon et al., 2012).
Finally, the roles of PMv, EBA and parietal regions (inferior parietal
lobule [IPL], anterior IPS) in bodily emotion processing were also ex-
amined in TMS studies, focusing more on the body-specificity and ac-
tion-related aspects. Under binocular rivalry presentations of faces or
bodies together with houses, stimulating pSTS decreased the dominance
of fearful faces versus houses, but enhanced the dominance for fearful
bodies (Candidi et al., 2015). In a body posture discrimination task,
stimulating pSTS enhanced the detection of posture changes in angry
bodies but not in neutral bodies. However, stimulating EBA and PMv
did not show such an effect dissociating between angry and neutral
postures (Candidi et al., 2011). Stimulating IPL enhances the processing
of fearful bodies compared to stimulating EBA (Engelen et al., 2015).
These studies highlighted the importance of dorsal action-related areas
in bodily emotion processing, in opposition to evidence of heads pro-
cessed in ventral face-specific areas, as suggested by a study reporting
fMRI-adaptation for whole- compared to headless-bodies in fusiform
(FFA) and occipital (OFA) face areas, instead of in EBA and FBA
(Brandman and Yovel, 2010).
2.4.2. Higher-order perception in social cognition
Aside from influencing initial perceptual processes and attention
paid to social stimuli such as faces and bodies discussed above, emo-
tion-attention interactions also influence higher-order social cognition
processes, such as impressions, judgements, and decisions (Freeman
and Ambady, 2011). For example, when interacting with unknown
others for whom no relevant information is available, people often
depend on a variety of factors, such as physical appearance, verbal
behavior (Ames et al., 2011), as well as nonverbal behavior, or affective
body language (de Gelder et al., 2010), as cues to form impressions.
Subtle cues conveyed through body language or physical touch, such as
a handshake or a gentle touch on the shoulder, can lead to positive
effects on behavior, reflected in greater feelings of security when
making risky financial decisions (Levav and Argo, 2010) or better
evaluations and better tips (Stephen and Zweigenhaft, 1986). During
typical social interactions, people engage in active social perception
processes, such as attending to othersʼ face and body language, to
evaluate the social situation. The majority of studies investigating the
neural correlates of social cognition have tended to focus on faces or
static whole body stimuli (Van den Stock et al., 2014), but emerging
research also highlights the importance of dynamic whole body stimuli
(Dolcos S. et al., 2012; Katsumi and Dolcos, 2018). These studies in-
dicate that the neural network underlying whole body perception partly
overlaps with the face network (de Gelder et al., 2010), and involves
the AMY, the FG, and the STS. Both faces and bodies are salient and
familiar in daily life, conveying information about the internal states
that is essential for social interactions, but only bodily expressions
allow perception of the action and of its emotional significance (Sinke
et al., 2012a), and hence prepare the perceiver for adaptive actions.
Recent studies using dynamic bodily expressions have investigated
the respective contribution of emotion processing and action-related
brain areas. Studies clearly show that the AMY is sensitive to the
emotional significance of body movements (de Gelder et al., 2012) and
modulates the engagement of body-selective areas (Peelen and
Downing, 2007). This modulatory role of the AMY is consistent with
research showing its involvement in several component processes, such
as stimulus appraisal, relevance detection, activation of neuroendocrine
responses, as well as somatic motor expressions of emotion (Sander
et al., 2005). Given its many connections to brain areas involved in
behavioral output (Mosher et al., 2010), the AMY is involved in as-
sessing the relevance of stimuli, signaling what is important in any
particular situation, and then modulating the appropriate attentional,
perceptual, autonomic, and cognitive/conceptual processes to deal with
the challenges or opportunities that are present (Cunningham et al.,
2010; Laine et al., 2009). The AMY is also sensitive to encoding social
information that is consistent, relative to inconsistent, with subsequent
positive or negative evaluations of another person (Schiller et al.,
2009). Together, the evidence highlights the role of AMY in processes
relevant for perception as well as higher-level cognition such as im-
pression formation.
Despite a large amount of research on the neural systems involved
in processing social cognition, relatively few studies have examined
how these regions are recruited when viewing social interaction scenes
(Centelles et al., 2011; Iacoboni et al., 2004). This is important because,
when viewing complex scenes involving social interactions, observers
spontaneously attempt to make sense of what is happening during the
social interaction (Wagner et al., 2012), by also engaging regions in-
volved in mentalizing (Iacoboni et al., 2004), such as the mPFC
(Amodio and Frith, 2006). Notably, recent research has examined the
neural basis of social cognition within a relevant social context (Dolcos
S. et al., 2012; Katsumi and Dolcos, 2018). Consistent with the roles of
the AMY, STS, and mPFC described above, findings from this line of
research highlight enhanced response to approach compared to avoid-
ance behaviors in these regions (Dolcos S. et al., 2012), and that greater
sensitivity to approach than to avoidance behaviors in AMY and STS
was linked to more positive evaluations of approach behaviors. This
research enhances the similarity to what happens in everyday life,
where people are typically involved in dynamic interactions with others
in a defined social context that guides their interpretation of the mental
and emotional states of the target (e.g., Aviezer et al., 2008) and ulti-
mately the evaluation of othersʼ attitudes and behaviors (see also Dolcos
S. et al., 2012; Katsumi and Dolcos, 2018).
Similarly, recent and emerging work with EEG/ERPs has expanded
the research on emotion-attention interactions and social cognition to
examine the dynamics of these processes. For example, early ERP
components such as P200/N200, which are associated with attentional
deployment (Luck and Hillyard, 1994), have been linked to early per-
ception and categorization of group membership (Ito and Bartholow,
2009). ERPs in slightly later time windows, such as the N400/450, have
been associated with the observation of actions, reflecting the extent to
which certain actions are expected vs. unexpected in a given (social)
context (Amoruso et al., 2013), as well as sensitivity to human presence
during social encounters (Katsumi et al., 2019a). ERPs in later time
windows, including the late positive potential (LPP), have been asso-
ciated with processing of social information such as biological motion
(Katsumi et al., 2019a; Proverbio et al., 2009), as well as with emotion
processing (Dolcos and Cabeza, 2002; Schupp et al., 2006).
Finally, a recent model proposes that there are dynamic interactions
between bottom-up signals, such as facial, vocal, and bodily cues, and
top-down factors, such as stereotypes and prior knowledge, that lead to
unified perceptions and responses to others (Freeman and Ambady,
2011). The kinds of information processed in the model include cue
level inputs (i.e., face, body, and voice cues), category level factors (i.e.,
gender, race, age, emotion), stereotypes level factors, and high level
cognitive states (Freeman et al., 2012), highlighting the interactions
that can occur between these factors. This and other similar models are
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helpful in furthering understanding of the complex number of factors
that influence social cognition/evaluation, and further support the idea
that emotion-attention interactions modulate higher-level social pro-
cesses. Importantly, these models might help shed light on the factors
that contribute to conditions where social-emotional functioning is
impaired, such as autism and social phobia (Gilboa-Schechtman et al.,
1999; Mazefsky et al., 2012).
3. Emotion-attention interactions in learning and memory
This section discusses evidence regarding emotion-attention inter-
actions linked to implicit and explicit types of memory, with a focus on
conditioning and working and episodic memory, respectively.
3.1. Fear conditioning
Our understanding of the detection of threat, the organization of
defensive behaviors, and activation of the defense circuitry in the brain
is based on animal studies primarily using Pavlovian fear conditioning
as an experimental paradigm. Defensive adaptations to acute or an-
ticipated threat associated with fear conditioning are characterized by a
close interplay of cognitive (including attention) and emotional pro-
cesses, as described below. Psychobiological models of defensive be-
haviors suggest that defensive reactivity is dynamically organized along
a continuum depending on the imminence or proximity of the threat,
from pre- to post-encounter defense, followed by circa-strike defense
(Threat-Imminence Model; Fanselow, 1994; Defense Cascade Model;
Blanchard and Blanchard, 1990; Lang et al., 1997; Action-Action Ten-
dency Model; Schauer and Elbert, 2010; adapted from Hamm et al.,
2016). These stages are accompanied by changes in the emotional and
attentional responses (e.g., from hypervigilance, to selective attention,
and attentive motor “freezing”) (Hamm et al., 2016).
3.1.1. Dynamics of defensive response mobilization
There is ample evidence in non-human animals suggesting that
defensive behaviors are organized along a dimension changing from
one to another depending upon the perceived proximity of the threat
(Blanchard and Blanchard, 1990; Fanselow, 1994). When the organism
is in an environment or a context in which a threat has been en-
countered before (or, in the case of humans, that the individual has just
been informed - e.g., by others or media - that a threat might occur but
has not yet been detected), a class of adaptive defensive behaviors (pre-
encounter defense; Fanselow, 1994) are engaged to pre-empt hostile and
threatening encounters. Such defensive behaviors include inhibition of
appetitive behaviors, threat-non-specific hypervigilance, and increased
autonomic arousal. Humans, in addition, often report feelings of an-
xiety, apprehension, or worry if they encounter such uncertain, novel,
and ambiguous environments and contexts in which potential threats
might occur (see Davis et al., 2010). As soon as the threatening stimulus
is detected but is still distant, a defensive response is activated (post-
encounter defense) that is characterized by an increase in selective at-
tention to the threatening cue (or the cue that is associated with threat),
accompanied by heart rate deceleration (fear bradycardia; Campbell
et al., 1997), potentiation of the startle reflex, gated through the central
nucleus of the AMY (for a review, see Hamm, 2015), and attentive
motor “freezing.” In humans, this defensive response pattern is often
labelled as a feeling of fear and individuals frequently report specific
fear triggers. If the reported fear also causes significant distress or im-
pairment, which is out of proportion of the actual danger (according to
the [cultural] context), such defensive responses are diagnosed as
symptoms of a Specific Phobia further specified and categorized ac-
cording to the fear triggers (e.g., animal phobia, height phobia).
Finally, with increasing imminence of the threat (circa-strike de-
fense), defensive response mobilization changes into action, which –
depending on the behavioral options at hand – can result in a fight/
flight response (if possible) or, when this is not an option, in tonic
immobility. Humans often report feelings of panic during circa-strike
defense. Initiation of such defensive actions (Kim et al., 2013) is ac-
companied by sympathoexcitatory responses, like tachycardia, hy-
pertension and redistribution of the blood flow (Benarroch, 2012). This
general discharge of the sympathetic nervous system also stimulates the
adrenal medulla to secrete the catecholamines epinephrine and nor-
epinephrine (NE) into the blood stream. Besides direct physiological
effects, adrenergic system activity modulates cognitive processes,
especially the formation and consolidation of emotional memories
(McGaugh, 2004; Weymar et al., 2009), thus resulting in better memory
of emotionally arousing events (e.g, traumatic events). Such dynamic
organization of defensive behaviors has been repeatedly advocated by
many researchers (for reviews see Adolphs, 2013; McNaughton, 2011).
3.1.2. Dynamic defensive response organization during human fear learning
By transferring these findings to human fear learning, one has to
keep in mind that human fear conditioning studies differ from animal
studies in many ways. Human participants know in which kind of ex-
periment they are participating and they have a free choice to do so or
not. Moreover, human participants are typically asked to determine the
level of aversiveness of the unconditioned stimulus (UCS) by them-
selves and they are informed that they can terminate the experiment
whenever they want. Given these constraints, it is even more important
to make sure that the measures of fear and anxiety are highly com-
parable with those obtained from animal research and not only include
a single dependent variable (like skin conductance responses that are
not specific indicators of fear but are also related to increased orienting)
to assess fear learning in humans. As outlined above we can assume that
human defensive behavior is also – like in non-human animals – dy-
namically organized. Thus, it is crucial to realize a multi-level analysis
approach including behavioral, physiological, and neural indices of
cognitive and emotional processes involved in the detection of threa-
tening cues and contexts, as well as in the dynamic organization of
defensive response mobilization. If this is taken into account, the or-
ganization of human defensive behavior is remarkably similar to that of
animals as outlined in the theoretical model above.
As soon as the occurrence of the threat is predicted by a conditioned
stimulus (distant threat) humans show a defensive response that is
again highly comparable to the response pattern observed in animals.
Humans – like rodents – show a reliable potentiation of the startle re-
sponse, which is measured by recording electromyographic activity of
the orbital portion of the orbicularis oculi muscle. This is elicited by
acoustic probes (a 50ms burst of white noise presented with in-
stantaneous rise time) delivered during the conditioned cue previously
associated with a shock, relative to the startle response to probes de-
livered during safety cues or during the intertrial interval (Hamm et al.,
1993). Conditioned startle potentiation is substantially stronger if the
conditioned cue predicts an aversive UCS, both in a single cue (Lipp
et al., 1994) and in a differential conditioning (Hamm and Vaitl, 1996).
Startle potentiation increases significantly with increasing temporal
proximity of the UCS if there is not behavioral option to avoid the
electrical stimulation (Löw et al., 2015).
Consistent with the role of AMY in these effects found in animal
research (see Davis, 2000 for neural circuitry underlying fear-induced
startle potentiation in rodents), fear conditioned startle potentiation is
significantly impaired in patients with unilateral lesions of the AMY
(Weike et al., 2005), while skin conductance conditioning remains in-
tact. Supporting these findings, fear potentiated startle was completely
blocked in a group of four female subjects with Urbach-Wiethe disease,
despite learned contingency reported by half of these subjects
(Klumpers et al., 2015). These data show that autonomic changes as
well as verbal reports observed during aversive conditioning can be
dissociated from fear potentiated startle and therefore reflect a different
component of the learned fear response. While conditioned stimuli (CS)
associated with an aversive UCS reliably elicit increase skin con-
ductance response, such increases are elicited by almost any novel,
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unexpected, arousing, significant, or potentially important stimulus in
the environment, even by the omission of an expected stimulus (Siddle,
1991). Thus, rather than a specific indicator of defensive response ac-
tivation, skin conductance responses have been interpreted as indexing
increased orienting or selective attention to the reinforced CS. Ac-
cordingly, increased conditioned skin conductance learning has been
observed not only for aversive but also for appetitive conditioning
(Nitschke et al., 2002; Weike et al., 2008).
The entire pattern of defensive response adaptation that can be
observed during Pavlovian fear conditioning where there is no option to
escape from the unconditioned stimulus can be described as attentive
freezing, which is comparable to the behavioral pattern observed in
animals during post-encounter defense. The defensive behavioral pat-
tern changes substantially, however, if humans have the behavioral
option to actively avoid the unconditioned stimulus. Under these cir-
cumstances, humans show a sharp increase in skin conductance and a
heart rate acceleration just prior to the initiation of the motor response.
In this context of active avoidance, the startle response is no longer
potentiated but rather inhibited. Moreover, the P3 amplitude of the ERP
evoked by the startle probes during this active defense mode are also
strongly inhibited while the N1 component of the same potential in-
creases (Krause et al., 2017; Löw et al., 2015). These data also support
findings in animals, suggesting that during circa-strike defense – where
active defensive behavior is initiated – attention to irrelevant stimuli of
the environment are selectively blocked while the sensory gain to the
same stimulus seems to be increased.
3.2. Working memory
3.2.1. Affective working memory
Working memory3 (WM) is the capacity-limited resource that tem-
porally maintains and stores information (Baddeley, 2003) in the ser-
vice of higher cognitive functions (fluid intelligence, for instance; Kane
et al., 2005). In everyday life, these cognitive functions are commonly
deployed in affective contexts. Despite this, the impact of affective in-
formation on working memory and the mechanisms through which that
impact is realized remain poorly understood (Schweizer and Dalgleish,
2016; Schweizer et al., 2019). However, the past two decades have seen
an exponential increase in the research investigating the effects of af-
fective information on WM performance. The impact of affective dis-
tracters on WM is discussed in the following section, and thus here we
focus on affective WM, defined as WM for affective material.
3.2.1.1. Affective enhancement vs. impairment. The evidence regarding
emotion-attention information reviewed in the sections above suggests
that, as with perception, WM performance may also be enhanced or
impaired by affective information depending on whether the affective
material is presented as task-relevant memoranda or as task-irrelevant
distracters4. Robust evidence from the long-term memory literature
(reviewed below) shows an emotional enhancement effect (LaBar and
Cabeza, 2006). This is proposed to be associated with enhanced early
encoding of the affective memory trace, which is then consolidated over
time (Murty et al., 2010). Improved encoding is associated with
increased recruitment of the AMY-HC complex in response to
affective compared to neutral memoranda (Phelps, 2004). The
mediation model of emotional memory (Talmi, 2013) argues that the
mnemonic enhancement arises from three interacting processes, which
can also be applied to affective WM. First, affective WM may be
enhanced due to prioritizing of affective information within the context
of limited attentional resources (Pourtois et al., 2013). Second,
encoding of affective information is prioritized because affective
relative to neutral information stands out (cf. the notion of "impact";
Ewbank et al., 2009). Third, encoding of affective information may be
facilitated by the organization of the material into shared thematic
links. Alternatively, however, WM for affective material may be
reduced compared to neutral material, because the regulatory
demands elicited by affective information draw resources away from
WM processing. This argument is supported by the neural architecture
underlying affect regulation and WM, as both processes depend on the
recruitment of shared neural substrates in the fronto-parietal control
network (Etkin et al., 2015). Here, we briefly review behavioral and
neural evidence to resolve these competing hypotheses.
3.2.1.2. Behavioral effects. WM paradigms commonly require
individuals to update information, such as numbers, letters, or shapes
in their memory store, while simultaneously trying to minimize
interference from other irrelevant material (e.g., Conway et al.,
2005). In affective WM tasks, the neutral memoranda are replaced
with ‘standardized’ affective stimuli that pertain to prototypical
affective goals presumed to be more or less relevant to all
participants (e.g., survival motives; Barrett, 2013; LeDoux, 2012).
These can include words (Bradley and Lang, 1999), faces (Tottenham
et al., 2009) and other affective images (Lang et al., 2008).
Unfortunately, however, these stimuli are arguably low in affective
significance (cf. approach and avoidance motivation; Elliot et al., 2013)
for psychologically healthy individuals5 (Pessoa, 2009). That is, while
these generic stimuli are still likely to receive some preferential
processing within the cognitive system, their modulating effect on
current task performance is proposed to be limited (Pessoa, 2009). At
the behavioral level, this relatively weak impact on prioritization is
likely to be both difficult to detect and replicate, as well as subject to
strong influences from study specific factors such as WM load. Indeed
WM for affective stimuli presented to healthy individuals shows mixed
effects, with some studies showing an affective enhancement (e.g.,
Cromheeke and Mueller, 2016; González-Garrido et al., 2015), whereas
others showing WM to be impaired for affective compared to neutral
material (e.g., Meule et al., 2012; Rebetez et al., 2015); there are also
some studies showing affective material to be remembered as easily as
neutral material (e.g., Grimm et al., 2012; Tamm et al., 2017). Although
these mixed effects support the notion of soft prioritization (Pessoa,
2009), suggesting that the stimuli used in laboratory research are low in
affective significance, other explanations are also possible. For instance,
using similar emotional standardized stimuli (e.g., pictures), studies of
emotional episodic memory tend to report more systematic effects than
studies of WM (Dolcos et al., 2011). This raises the possibility that it
may be the nature of cognitive processes (episodic vs. working memory)
that may be differentially susceptible to effects of emotion, rather than
the properties of the stimuli themselves, that may influence their
impact on cognitive performance when emotional information is task-
relevant or task-irrelevant distraction, respectively (Dolcos et al.,
3 There are several competing theories of WM, generating vibrant debate
around definitions and underlying mechanisms (cf. Miyake and Shah, 1999),
which we acknowledge. An in-depth discussion of these debates, however, is
beyond the scope of this review.
4 Although in this section we focus our discussion on the role of emotion in
WM based on task relevance, it is also important to note here that other factors,
such as those related to cognitive load and familiarity, have also been shown to
influence WM and the associated mechanisms. For instance, greater WM load
has been shown to attenuate processing of task-irrelevant negative distracters
and the amplitude of the associated LPP (Hur et al., 2016; MacNamara et al.,
2011). Moreover, greater familiarity with task-irrelevant distracters (e.g., faces
of a loved one) has been linked to enhanced LPP amplitude, although it does not
appear to significantly impair WM performance (Langeslag and van Strien,
2017).
5 Here, we focus on psychologically healthy individuals. Affective material,
however, has been shown to have greater affective significance in individuals
with mental health disorders. For a discussion of the role of attentional control
in mental health difficulties including mood, anxiety, and stress-related dis-
orders see below in sections 4 and 5.
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2013). The latter may also be more susceptible to individual differences
in the response to emotional distraction.
3.2.1.3. Neural effects. At the neural level, however, the effects of soft
prioritization of standardized affective information should be easier to
detect, because affective compared to neutral stimuli are proposed to
have stronger perceptual representations in the brain’s sensory cortices,
especially the occipital cortex (Satpute et al., 2015). This increased
strength of representation is reflected in augmented projections to the
AMY leading to prioritized attentional processing within the brain’s
‘salience network’ (Seeley et al., 2007; cf. ventral attention; Corbetta
and Shulman, 2002). Greater direct processing of affective information,
relative to neutral, in the fronto-parietal control network is a second
source of variance which may be detectable at the neural level (Okon-
Singer et al., 2015; Pessoa, 2009). However, given the dlPFC
involvement in WM, affect-related differences are likely to be more
visible in nodes associated with processing of affective competition in
particular in the vlPFC and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Bush et al.,
2000; Iordan and Dolcos, 2017). In line with this proposal, the
neuroimaging findings in healthy individuals appeared more
consistent showing increased activation in the vlPFC, AMY, and
sensory cortices in response to trials that require the maintenance of
affective compared to neutral material in WM (Kerestes et al., 2012).
However, Grimm et al. (2012) showed a pattern of decreased activation
in the predicted regions and Perlstein and colleagues (Perlstein et al.,
2002) showed dissociating effects of positive and negative material on
dlPFC activation (see also next section).
In sum, affective WM appears to show relatively reliable neural
recruitment of the ventral affective system (see also next section), yet in
the laboratory behavioral effects are more mixed. Research is needed to
investigate the association between affective WM paradigms used in the
laboratory and affective WM capacity in real world environments (e.g.,
Pe et al., 2013a). WM tasks with affective material as distracters dis-
cussed below (e.g., task-irrelevant affective images; Dolcos et al., 2013)
may constitute a closer approximation of the everyday contexts in
which WM is commonly deployed.
3.2.2. Emotional distraction and working memory
In addition to its impact at the level of perception (see Section 2.2
above), the detrimental effects of task-irrelevant emotional distraction
have also been investigated with respect to WM processes (reviewed in
Iordan et al., 2013b; or affective sentences; Schweizer and Dalgleish,
2016). Of note, recent views in cognitive neuroscience identify selective
attention and WM processes as largely overlapping or highly related
constructs (Awh et al., 2006; Gazzaley and Nobre, 2012). Therefore,
evidence regarding the role of distracting emotional information and
how it affects the ability to temporarily maintain perceptual re-
presentations in mind bears particular relevance to the focus of this
review. Models of affective-cognitive interactions inspired by clinical
studies point to dysfunctional interactions between a dorsal executive
neural system (DES) and a ventral affective system (VAS), and propose
that impaired executive control and enhanced emotional distractibility
observed in depression are linked to hypofunction of the DES and hy-
perfunction of the VAS (Drevets and Raichle, 1998; Mayberg, 2006).
DES includes brain regions typically associated with executive func-
tions, such as the dlPFC and the lateral parietal cortex (LPC), which are
critical to active maintenance of goal-relevant information in WM. In-
creased activity in these regions during WM tasks is typically associated
with increased task performance (D’Esposito et al., 2000; Miller and
Cohen, 2001). VAS includes brain regions involved in emotion pro-
cessing, such as the AMY, vlPFC, and mPFC (Lindquist et al., 2012;
Vytal and Hamann, 2010).
Findings from recent studies investigating the neural correlates of
cognitive interference by emotional distraction in healthy participants
provide evidence that interactions between the DES and VAS are not
only reflected in longer-lasting altered states, as observed in clinical
conditions such as depression, but can also occur transiently, in re-
sponse to ongoing task-irrelevant emotional distracters. A series of
studies by Dolcos and colleagues, investigating the neural correlates of
processing emotional distraction, identified dissociable patterns of
brain activity in the DES vs. VAS, which were specific to transient
distracting emotions (Dolcos et al., 2008; Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006;
Dolcos et al., 2007). The basic approach involved recording of brain
activity using fMRI, while participants performed a delayed-response
WM task with emotional distraction (see also Wong et al., 2012). The
WM task involved keeping in mind a set of human faces (Memoranda)
for the duration of a short delay, and then indicating whether a single
face (Probe) was part of the initial set or not. During the delay interval
between the memoranda and the probe, highly-arousing negative pic-
tures were presented as task-irrelevant distracters. Participants were
instructed to look at the distracters but maintain focus on the memor-
anda, and to make quick and accurate responses to the probes. Im-
portantly, this task allowed clear dissociations of the time course of
neural responses to emotional distraction in the DES and VAS as well as
an objective quantification of the impact of emotional distraction on
WM performance.
Using this paradigm, the study by Dolcos and McCarthy (2006)
provided initial brain imaging evidence that impaired WM performance
in the presence of emotional distraction is linked to increased activity in
the VAS regions involved in emotion processing (e.g., AMY, vlPFC)
while disrupting delay interval activity in the DES regions implicated in
attentional processes and active maintenance of task-relevant in-
formation in WM (e.g., dlPFC, LPC). This opposing pattern of changes in
VAS and DES activity was confirmed by significant region× condition
interactions (Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006). Importantly, the disruption
of DES activation was associated with impaired WM performance. The
results of this study are consistent with the idea that activity in the
affective and executive neural systems is interconnected, such that in-
creased activity in the VAS regions in the presence of transient emo-
tional distracters temporarily takes off-line the DES and results in WM
impairment, possibly as a result of a re-allocation of processing re-
sources by emotional distraction (Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006).
These findings are consistent with the idea that the outcome of task-
irrelevant emotional distraction depends on dynamic interactions be-
tween neural systems that allow the ability to stay focused on task-
relevant information and systems involved in the processing of emo-
tional information that may compete with the available processing re-
sources. Possibly as a result of their salience, emotional distracters may
produce a bottom-up impact on processing of goal-relevant information
by re-allocating processing resources (Vuilleumier et al., 2001) and
impairing performance. Although the exact nature of these resources is
not clear, one possible interpretation is along the lines of Desimone and
Duncan’s (1995) biased competition model of selective attention, con-
sistent with the idea that processing of emotional stimuli requires at-
tentional resources, and that emotional stimuli compete for neural re-
presentation with all the other stimuli. Hence, the emotional distracters
tap into the same resources necessary to process the task-relevant in-
formation, and impair WM performance. It is possible, however, that
processing of emotional, especially threatening, information is prior-
itized, and hence it occurs automatically, without being limited by the
availability of attentional resources (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003), as we
discussed in previous sections.
More recent evidence also points to differential effects of positive
and negative distraction and provides information about the timing of
processing emotional distraction. Using an adaptation of the afore-
mentioned WM paradigm, a recent study by Iordan and Dolcos (2017)
has demonstrated that positive distraction had a reduced impact on WM
performance compared to negative distraction. At the neural level, al-
though processing of both positive and negative distraction was com-
monly associated with (arousal-driven) modulation of activity in the
DES and VAS regions, these regions also showed dissociable activity by
the valence of distraction. Specifically, processing of negative
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distraction was associated with greater deactivation of the LPC (DES),
whereas that of positive distraction was associated with greater acti-
vation of posterior vlPFC (Brodmann Area [BA] 9, VAS). Notably, ac-
tivity in more inferior vlPFC (BA 45) was also positively correlated with
WM performance under positive distraction (Iordan and Dolcos, 2017).
Thus, reduced impact of positive distraction on WM performance is
linked to both reduced impact on DES regions and increased engage-
ment of VAS regions in coping with emotional distraction. Furthermore,
common and dissociable effects of positive vs. negative distraction have
also been identified in the temporal domain (García-Pacios et al., 2015).
Together with the fMRI findings, these results point to possible spatial
and temporal dissociations linked to the impact of vs. coping with
emotional distraction in anterior lateral PFC/early time window vs.
posterior lateral PFC/late time window, respectively (see also Dolcos
et al., 2013).
3.2.2.1. Emotion-attention interactions linking the impact of distraction on
working and episodic memory. Finally, similar to the evidence linking
opposing effects of emotional distraction on perception and memory
(Shafer and Dolcos, 2012), a study by Dolcos et al. (2013) linked
opposing effects of emotion on WM (impaired) and episodic memory
(enhanced). In particular, although AMY had a pivotal role in both
effects, the impairing and enhancing effects of emotion were associated
with greater dlPFC deactivation and HC activation, respectively. This
suggests that task-irrelevant emotional distraction diverts processing
resources from the main WM task (Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006), while
initiating processing that leads to enhanced subsequent memory for the
distracters themselves. Interestingly, trials producing enhanced
episodic memory performance without disrupting WM performance
were associated with increased vlPFC activity (Dolcos et al., 2013),
possibly reflecting the engagement of mechanisms to cope with
emotional distraction during WM, which then contributed to
enhanced subsequent memory for the distracters.
In summary, studies investigating the neural correlates of the basic
response to emotional distraction point to an interplay between two
major neural systems: a ventral system (VAS), associated with emo-
tional processing, showing increased activity, and a dorsal system
(DES), associated with executive processing, showing decreased ac-
tivity. The impact of task-irrelevant emotional distraction is chiefly
supported by bottom-up mechanisms that may redirect processing re-
sources away from the main cognitive task and toward stimuli with
enhanced relevance for survival. Emerging evidence demonstrates that
these mechanisms are also modulated by the valence of emotional
distraction, with positive distraction being associated with reduced
impact on the main task by virtue of increased engagement of coping
mechanisms through posterior vlPFC. Negative distraction, possibly due
to its greater WM interference, also seems to engage top-down control
mechanisms involving specific regions of the dlPFC and vlPFC, as early
as ∼400ms following the onset of distracters. Finally, the immediate
impairing impact of emotional distraction on WM and the long-term
enhancing impact of emotion on episodic memory appear to be medi-
ated by overlapping and dissociable neural systems, involving bottom-
up (medial temporal lobe [MTL]) and top-down (PFC) mechanisms.
3.3. Episodic memory
3.3.1. Basic fMRI evidence
Emotion has not only transient effects on cognitive processing, by
influencing initial perceptual processes and attention paid to emotional
stimuli or to details surrounding emotional events, but also long-lasting
effects, which may eventually lead to better memory for those events.
Vivid memories for emotionally charged personal events is anecdotal
evidence supporting this notion, but there is also empirical evidence
that emotional events are better remembered than neutral events (e.g.,
Bradley et al., 1992). Previous research has investigated the beneficial
impact of emotion on long-term memory at various stages (reviewed in
Dolcos et al., 2012; Dolcos et al., 2017b), by typically considering two
orthogonal dimensions of basic emotional properties, arousal and va-
lence (Russell and Barrett, 1999). In addition, to minimize possible
confounds related to general perceptual processing and to isolate
memory-related neural mechanisms, brain imaging studies of emotional
episodic memory typically calculate the so-called subsequent memory
or difference due to memory (Dm) effects – that is, differential brain
activity associated with remembered vs. forgotten items (Dolcos and
Denkova, 2014; Dolcos et al., 2012; Shafer et al., 2011).
In general, current research mainly highlights the role of two me-
chanisms involved in the enhancing effect of emotion on episodic
memory: (1) MTL-based mechanisms, involving the AMY and memory-
related MTL regions, such as the HC and associated parahippocampal
cortices, and (2) non-MTL mechanisms, involving PFC regions, among
others (e.g., parietal cortex) (Dolcos et al., 2012). The MTL mechanism
contributes to the memory-enhancing effect of emotion through direct/
bottom-up neurohormonal interactions between the AMY and memory-
related MTL regions, during encoding (e.g., Dolcos et al., 2004b),
consolidation (McGaugh, 2004; Ritchey et al., 2008), and retrieval
(Dolcos et al., 2005) of emotional memories. The non-MTL mechanism
contributes to the memory-enhancing effect of emotion through in-
direct/top-down interactions, by enhancing semantic and executive
processing, including attention (LaBar and Cabeza, 2006). Below, we
discuss basic evidence regarding the role of these mechanisms during
encoding and retrieval, based on fMRI studies.
3.3.1.1. Emotional memory encoding. Previous neuroimaging studies
have identified the critical role of the interaction between the AMY
and the memory-related MTL brain areas in successful encoding of
emotionally arousing information (e.g., Dolcos et al., 2004b; Kensinger
and Corkin, 2004), and showed that this within-MTL functional
interaction is important for the persistence of emotional memories
over time (Ritchey et al., 2008). More recently, it has been shown that
encoding of emotionally arousing stimuli over an extended period
(> 20min) also induces a sustained arousal-related brain state
(reflected in increased AMY-HC functional connectivity), which
overall contributes to greater recollection of unrelated neutral items
encoded minutes following the initial encoding of emotional ones
(Tambini et al., 2017). This suggests that transient exposure to
emotional arousal can also create persistent “carry-over” effects,
resulting in similar memory-enhancing effects for subsequently-
encountered neutral items (Fitzgerald et al., 2011; Hermans et al.,
2014). Whereas AMY-MTL mechanisms are modulated primarily by
arousal, the involvement of the PFC in emotional memory encoding
seems to be influenced by valence (Dolcos et al., 2004a; Kensinger and
Schacter, 2006). For instance, there is evidence that AMY-HC functional
coupling tends to be enhanced for encoding of negative stimuli,
whereas PFC-HC coupling is stronger for encoding of positive stimuli
(Mickley Steinmetz et al., 2010; Ritchey et al., 2011b). In addition,
there is also evidence showing that successful encoding of positive
stimuli is associated with activation in frontal and parietal regions,
whereas that of negative stimuli is associated with activation in
temporal and occipital regions (Kensinger and Schacter, 2008;
Mickley Steinmetz and Kensinger, 2009). This evidence lends support
to other studies showing that encoding of positive information is related
to activity in specific regions within the PFC (Dolcos et al., 2004a),
likely due to increased processing requiring more cognitive resources
(D’Esposito et al., 2000), whereas encoding of negative information is
related to temporal and occipital areas (Mickley and Kensinger, 2008),
likely due to enhanced sensory processing (Vuilleumier et al., 2004).
3.3.1.2. Emotional memory retrieval. Emotional retrieval has been
mainly studied using two types of stimuli: (1) laboratory micro-
events, such as a series of words or pictures, encoded in laboratory
settings and retrieved at relatively shorter intervals following encoding
(e.g., from minutes to months), and (2) autobiographical events,
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referring to episodes from one’s personal past, encoded in everyday life
and usually retrieved after much longer intervals (e.g., years, decades).
Similar to emotional encoding, previous studies provided evidence
showing that successful emotional retrieval of laboratory micro-events
involves the AMY-MTL mechanisms (Dolcos et al., 2005; Kensinger and
Schacter, 2005). The AMY also seems to be involved in successful
retrieval of emotionally arousing and personally relevant
autobiographical memories (AMs), following shorter retention
intervals (Muscatell et al., 2010). In addition, AMY’s engagement
during retrieval of more remote AMs seems to be dependent on task
instructions associated with different levels of effortful processing
(Smith et al., 2006), which may account for inconsistent findings
regarding the AMY involvement in emotional AM retrieval (e.g.,
Vandekerckhove et al., 2005). Because the level of effortful
processing is increased when remembering temporally dispersed past
events, this could lead to diversion of attentional resources from the
emotional value associated with recollection of such events (Phan et al.,
2002). This idea has been supported by evidence from a recent study
showing that attentional focus on emotional details (as opposed to non-
emotional, contextual details) during recollection of emotional AMs
was associated with increased activity in the left AMY (Denkova et al.,
2013b). Also, similar to the evidence from encoding, AMY-MTL
interactions also play a critical role in emotional retrieval, suggesting
that the AMY and the memory-related MTL regions constitute a
synergistic mechanism in which emotion and recollection enhance
each other (Dolcos et al., 2005).
Importantly, retrieval-related functional interaction within the MTL
also seems to be modulated by the PFC involvement. For instance, both
increased AMY−HC connectivity and increased mPFC activity have
been observed during emotional memory retrieval (Smith et al., 2006).
Interestingly, the mPFC also modulated AMY and HC activity during
retrieval of emotional information compared to that of non-emotional
information. This result suggests that activity in the AMY can be
modulated by task goals (Cunningham et al., 2008), and identifies the
involvement of top-down processes linked to emotional memory re-
trieval subserved by the mPFC (see also Denkova et al., 2015). Finally,
studies of memory retrieval for emotional laboratory (Smith et al.,
2006) and autobiographical (Markowitsch et al., 2003) events have also
identified the involvement of PFC regions linked to processing of
emotional valence. In particular, increased medial and orbital PFC ac-
tivity was identified during retrieval of positive contextual information
and of positive AMs (Markowitsch et al., 2003). In addition, increased
activity in the lateral PFC was associated with recollection of positive
(but not negative) AMs while focusing on emotional details compared
to non-emotional ones (Denkova et al., 2013a). The medial orbital PFC
has been associated with affective valuation, reward-related processing,
and self-referential processing (Heinzel and Northoff, 2009), whereas
the lateral PFC has also been linked to the subjective experience of
emotion (Wager et al., 2008), although given its functional hetero-
geneity (e.g., Petrides and Pandya, 2002) it is also associated with other
aspects of emotion processing (e.g., emotion regulation, coping with
distraction, Buhle et al., 2014; Dolcos et al., 2006). Taken together,
these findings suggest that the involvement of specific medial/orbital
and lateral PFC regions during retrieval of positive emotional in-
formation may reflect processing of self-relevant positive/rewarding
experience (Dolcos et al., 2017b).
In sum, the evidence discussed above supports the notion that the
memory-enhancing effect of emotion during encoding and retrieval is
linked to increased engagement of and interaction among MTL and non-
MTL (e.g., PFC) areas, involved in affective and mnemonic processes as
well as other types of processing. While the MTL-based memory me-
chanism is relatively more involved in arousal-dependent effects, va-
lence-related effects are linked to connectivity of these regions within
and outside the MTL. Regarding the role of non-MTL regions, available
evidence suggests that the involvement of PFC and other cortical areas
(e.g., parietal) is relatively more sensitive to processing of valence and
reflects higher order processes (e.g., semantic and working memory,
attention, cognitive control, and self-referential processing).
3.3.2. EEG/ERP evidence
Given its temporal resolution, EEG/ERP may be particularly re-
levant to unfold brief and early cognitive events (e.g., Pourtois et al.,
2004; Schupp et al., 2003) related to the impact that emotion may have
on encoding (e.g., Dolcos and Cabeza, 2002), consolidation, and re-
trieval processes (e.g., Schaefer et al., 2011; Weymar et al., 2009).
Similar to fMRI studies, EEG/ERP research on episodic emotional
memory has mainly been focused on the modulatory effects of emotion
on the processes related to memory encoding and retrieval, and less so
on consolidation. Research focusing on encoding typically assesses
changes in the brain dynamics by means of the subsequent memory/Dm
effect. Research on retrieval usually assesses electrophysiological
changes associated with the Old/New ERP effect (i.e., difference be-
tween correctly recognized old items and correctly identified new
items, during recognition memory tests).
3.3.2.1. ERP correlates of emotional memory encoding. To date, the
amount of ERP research focusing on the modulation on these
processes by emotions is surprisingly scarce. In one of the first
studies, Dolcos and Cabeza (2002) showed that, during an early
epoch (400–600ms), successfully remembered emotional pictures
prompted a larger positive-going waveform than subsequently
forgotten emotional pictures at central electrodes, an effect that was
absent for neutral pictures. This ERP deflection had similar spatio-
temporal characteristics to the LPP, a positive-going ERP usually
observed during emotional picture processing that starts around
400ms after stimulus onset over centro-parietal regions (e.g.,
Cuthbert et al., 2000). Because the LPP indicates sustained processing
towards motivationally-relevant information (see for reviews, Hajcak
et al., 2012; Lang and Bradley, 2010), the authors concluded that the
enhanced memory encoding of emotional information reflects
prioritized attentional processing that results in better subsequent
memory (Dolcos and Cabeza, 2002; but see Galli and Otten, 2011).
This interpretation is consistent with findings from studies using
correlational approaches linking the amplitude of LPP response to
better memory recall for emotional pictures (Palomba et al., 1997),
indicating that attentional and elaborative processing leads to better
memory formation for emotionally-relevant information (Weymar
et al., 2012).
Similar results were observed in a more recent study using fearful
facial expressions, which produced larger early (350–600ms) Dm ef-
fects over central regions than neutral expressions (Righi et al., 2012)
and overall available evidence suggests that memory for emotional
stimuli benefits from enhanced attentional deployment towards emo-
tional information but only when neutral information is present at the
time of encoding (Wirkner et al., 2013; but see Schupp et al., 2012).
Finally, the enhanced processing for emotional information during
encoding also predicts enhanced memory for source information asso-
ciated with emotional events. In a recent study by Yick et al. (2015), at
encoding, participants viewed a series of emotional and neutral scenes
in two different blocks. Then, during retrieval, participants were pre-
sented with Old and New scenes and were asked to indicate whether
they recognized the scenes and their origin (i.e., block 1 or block 2).
Behaviorally, memory for emotional images and their location was
better than for their neutral counterparts. At a neurophysiological level,
correctly recognized emotional images generated a larger positivity
than forgotten ones in a time window between 200 and 1500ms,
especially for the highly arousing pictorial information. Interestingly,
when source information was correctly retrieved, larger Dm effects
(400–1000ms) were observed for emotional materials over anterior
and posterior regions. This novel finding extends prior results in-
dicating that emotional arousal not only facilitates the encoding of
emotional items but also of associated source information (Yick et al.,
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2015), leading to a robust long-lasting memory trace (see also discus-
sion below on source memory ERP effects during retrieval).
Taken together, the ERP encoding results suggest that under limited
capacity for neural representations (Bundesen et al., 2005), the set of
processes involved in memory encoding prioritizes resources towards
emotionally relevant information, at the cost of neutral non-relevant
information (Watts et al., 2014; see for a review Mather and Sutherland,
2011). In turn, this leads to better memory formation for both emo-
tional items and their associated source information.
3.3.2.2. ERP correlates of emotional memory retrieval. This section
discusses evidence regarding both item and context memory.
Regarding item memory, interestingly, the majority of the EEG
research on emotional episodic memory has focused on ERPs during
retrieval (see for review Weymar and Hamm, 2013; Weymar et al.,
2009). A hallmark finding in this field is that correctly classified old
items evoke an overall more positive-going ERP waveform than
correctly classified new items (Rugg and Curran, 2007). This
difference in ERP responses has been labeled as the ERP Old/New
effect. Across a large number of studies using different stimulus
material such as words (Maratos et al., 2000; Weymar et al., 2014),
faces (Graham and Cabeza, 2001; Kissler and Strehlow, 2017), or scenes
(e.g., Weymar et al., 2011, 2010), results have been mixed for the ERP
Old/New effect for emotional and neutral contents, with some studies
findings enhanced ERP Old/New differences, mostly over parietal
electrodes indicating recollection, while others found no ERP
differences as a function of emotionality. This discrepancy could be
related to factors such as arousal or stimulus type, but also to
differences in the retention interval used across studies (see Weymar
and Hamm, 2013). In this sense, the retention interval and thereby
sufficient consolidation (McGaugh, 2004; Yonelinas and Ritchey, 2015)
has been shown to mediate the enhancing effect of emotion on episodic
memories (Sharot and Phelps, 2004).
Whereas short consolidation periods (e.g. 3–5min after encoding)
result in comparable recognition rates for emotional and neutral items
(Sharot and Phelps, 2004), longer delays (> 24 h) lead to a prominent
memory advantage for emotional materials. This is because, with
longer delays, recognition rates prevail for emotional items, but decline
for neutral items (Ritchey et al., 2008). Similarly, during immediate
retrieval tests, divergent ERP results have been often reported. In some
studies larger ERP Old/New effects for emotionally arousing (both
pleasant and unpleasant) items compared to neutral ones were ob-
served (Langeslag et al., 2008), but in others these effects were absent
(Weymar et al., 2013a). However, when memory is tested after long
consolidation periods (> 24 h), enhanced late parietal Old/New dif-
ferences have been reliably found for emotional items (e.g., Wirkner
et al., 2015, 2018). Furthermore, ERP Old/New differences for emo-
tional contents seem to be tremendously long-lasting over time. When
memory for emotional and neutral materials is tested one year after
encoding, emotional items are still better remembered than neutral
ones (Dolcos et al., 2005; Weymar et al., 2011), which is also related to
larger parietal ERP Old/New effects for emotionally arousing (espe-
cially unpleasant) items compared to neutral ones (Weymar et al.,
2011).
Finally, more recent ERP memory studies revealed that the en-
hanced Old/New effect for emotional information occurs automatically,
even when no intentional retrieval is instructed (Ferrari et al., 2013;
Weymar et al., 2013a). These findings come from studies in which
participants were engaged in non-memory-related tasks, involving free
viewing (Weymar et al., 2013a), or active decision-making (Ferrari
et al., 2013; Weymar et al., 2013a), while viewing old and new emo-
tional and neutral images. Results showed that even when participants
did not intend a memory search but view a memory cue, immediate
retrieval was enhanced for emotional relative to neutral scenes, as re-
flected by enhanced parietal Old/New differences (Ferrari et al., 2013;
Weymar et al., 2013a), suggesting that emotional scenes also trigger
recollection in a spontaneous fashion.
Besides item memory, one important aspect of human memory
concerns the binding of contextual information (e.g., time, place, or
associative cues) that constitutes many disparate features of a unified
event (Davachi, 2006; Ranganath, 2010). In light of the relevance of
such associative mechanism in our life, the question that arises is about
what impact emotion exerts on memory for items as a part of, or in
relation to, other items (Chiu et al., 2013). Despite abundant data
showing enhancing emotional effects in item memory, the evidence
regarding emotional influences on the accuracy of remembering con-
textual details is mixed (for reviews, see Chiu et al., 2013; Dolcos et al.,
2017b; Weymar and Hamm, 2013). Similarly, ERP research in-
vestigating the effects of emotion on memory for associated neutral
information has also yielded mixed findings (Jaeger and Rugg, 2012;
Martínez-Galindo and Cansino, 2017). Recent ERP studies, however,
indicate that one critical factor could be related to the retention interval
(as for item memory), showing enhanced ERP Old/New differences for
emotional, compared to neutral, associates when memory is tested one
week after encoding (Ventura-Bort et al., 2017, 2016), but not when
tested immediately or 24 h following encoding (Jaeger et al., 2009;
Smith et al., 2004).
One other critical factor mediating potential modulatory effects of
emotion on relational memory may be related to the binding strategy
used during encoding (Mackay et al., 2004; Mather, 2007). According
to the arousal-biased competition (ABC) theory (Mather and
Sutherland, 2011), emotional arousal can lead to enhancement and
impairment among neutral stimuli competing for attention depending
on high or low priority (due to bottom-up perceptual salience or top-
down attentional focus). The theory further suggests that emotional
arousal may enhance associative memory for features of high priority
items (e.g., color or location of an item) and impair memory for neutral
items, when presented at the same time with emotional items. Thus,
emotion can facilitate memory for intrinsically associated features of
emotional stimuli (i.e. within-item associated details), but can also
undermine memory for associated extrinsic cues (i.e. between-item
contextual features) of the emotional information (Chiu et al., 2013;
Mather, 2007). However, if the association between emotional cues and
extrinsic neutral items is well integrated, memory for neutral items may
improve due to the acquisition of high priority. These issues are the
focus of an emerging debate in the literature on emotional memory
(Dolcos et al., 2017b; see also Ventura-Bort et al., 2017; Weymar et al.,
2014).
3.3.2.3. Oscillatory correlates of emotional episodic memory. Finally,
besides ERPs, research has increasingly focused on the role of
neuronal oscillation and synchronization on episodic memories (see
for a review Nyhus and Curran, 2010), emphasizing the role of gamma
(25–100 Hz) and theta (4–8 Hz) oscillations on the formation and
retrieval of episodic memories (Nyhus and Curran, 2010). For
instance, several studies observed that successful encoding is
associated with greater gamma power and gamma synchronization
(e.g., Gruber et al., 2001; Sederberg et al., 2007), and that theta and
gamma oscillations support retrieval processes (Ferrari et al., 2015;
Summerfield and Mangels, 2005). However, most of the evidence
indicating that these synchronizations mediate emotional memory
retrieval comes from animal research (e.g., Pare et al., 2002), and
thus more research in humans is needed (Gärtner and Bajbouj, 2014).
Taken together, ERP results showed that memory retrieval is en-
hanced for emotional stimuli and associated neutral information with
high attentional priority, as reflected by enhanced ERP Old/New dif-
ferences. This memory advantage is likely driven by HC-mediated re-
collective processes, which as for item memory may be most robust
following longer consolidation intervals. In addition, despite overall
mixed findings, there is also evidence that emotional information also
enhances memory for contextual details. Regarding the oscillatory
correlates, available data indicate that theta and gamma oscillations in
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the MTL and cortical regions are involved in the formation and retrieval
of episodic memories, which in synchronization with the AMY con-
tribute to the generation of emotionally relevant episodic memories.
Notably, attention, learning, and memory are also critically affected
by stress. Stressors initiate various bodily adaptation processes to re-
establish physiological homoeostasis and promote long-term well-being
by interacting with emotional and cognitive processes. Therefore, al-
though not the focus of the present review, it should be noted that stress
induction is also a way of manipulating responses and influencing
emotion-attention interactions6. These stress-induced alterations are
thought to be involved in the development, establishment, and main-
tenance of various stress-related disorders, such as post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), and of other emotional disturbances (anxiety, de-
pression), which are discussed further in the following sections.
4. Individual differences in emotion-attention interactions
In the field of emotion processing, individual differences are the
norm rather than the exception (Hamann and Canli, 2004). Hence,
when assessing emotional reactions, individual differences should be
examined rather than being regarded as statistical noise (Kosslyn et al.,
2002; Phan et al., 2003). Because such differences can affect aspects of
processing that are relevant to understanding clinical conditions, the
present section discusses the role of a wide range of individual differ-
ences that influence emotion processing – from developmental (at both
early and later stages) and sex to personality and clinical differences
linked to various disorders (anxiety, depression, and PTSD).
4.1. Developmental differences
4.1.1. Early stages: childhood and adolescence
4.1.1.1. Emotional distraction. The ability to resist interference from
distracting emotional information while sustaining attention on goal-
directed behavior is critical for adaptive behavior. Using “classic”
cognitive control tasks such as the flanker (Grose-Fifer et al., 2013),
Stroop and Go/No-Go (Tottenham et al., 2011), several studies have
examined age-related differences in interference from distracters that
include socially- and/or emotionally-relevant information, such as
facial expressions or emotional words (e.g., Cohen-Gilbert and
Thomas, 2013; Grose-Fifer et al., 2013). Most studies have focused on
childhood and adolescence, with a few focusing on infancy and
preschool age. A linear decrease in interference from such distracters
from childhood into adulthood has been documented by some studies
(Somerville et al., 2011; Tottenham et al., 2011). For instance,
Tottenham et al. (2011) examined the performance of children (5–12
years old), adolescents (13–18 years old), and adults (19–28 years old)
using a block design emotional Go/No-Go task, and showed that
performance improved with age. Nevertheless, across the age groups,
false alarms occurred more frequently to emotional relative to neutral
face No-Go stimuli, which were interpreted as indexing reduced
inhibitory control in the context of emotionally salient emotional
information. Using a similar version of the task in the MRI scanner,
Hare and colleagues documented elevated AMY activation in
adolescents relative to children and adults on this task (Hare et al.,
2008). Furthermore, elevated AMY and reduced vlPFC activation
positively correlated with slower RTs to the fearful (versus happy)
face target stimuli. Functional connectivity analyses revealed that the
strength of AMY-vlPFC coupling was correlated with greater
habituation of AMY activity to fearful face targets in adolescence
(Hare et al., 2008). Such findings have been interpreted in terms of
neurodevelopmental changes in neural systems supporting cognitive
control into the adult years (Bunge et al., 2002; Rubia et al., 2006).
Other studies, however, have reported a curvilinear developmental
pattern, with emotional distracters showing the greatest influence on
task performance during adolescence (e.g., Cohen-Gilbert and Thomas,
2013; Grose-Fifer et al., 2013). For instance, studies examining devel-
opmental changes in emotional interference found that adolescents
(aged 11 to 19 years) showed greater interference to negative compared
to positive and neutral emotional conditions on an emotional Go-NoGo
task (Cohen-Gilbert and Thomas, 2013), and to fearful compared to
happy faces on an emotional Flanker task (Grose-Fifer et al., 2013). This
curvilinear pattern has been attributed to a maturational gap between
subcortical regions supporting emotion processing, which has been
characterized as highly-reactive, and still-maturing prefrontal cortical
regions supporting cognitive control and regulatory processes (Casey
and Galvan, 2016). Consequently, adolescents are more likely to show a
preferential processing for social and emotional information (Monk
et al., 2003; Nelson et al., 2005), which is posited to underlie an ado-
lescent-specific peak interference from emotional distracters and ado-
lescents’ increased vulnerability to affective disorders.
Recognizing the limitations of rather simplistic models based pri-
marily on immaturity of prefrontal cortical regions, a third develop-
mental pattern pertaining to the development of neural systems sup-
porting the interactions between cognitive, emotional, and social
processing has been observed, whereby neural activation in prefrontal
cortical regions supporting cognitive control increases during mid-
adolescence (Crone and Dahl, 2012; Geier et al., 2010). Researchers
interpret this pattern as evidence of increased task engagement during
adolescence and suggest that there are some contexts (e.g., peer inter-
action or reward seeking) in which adolescents might recruit greater
cognitive control than adults or children, thereby showing less cogni-
tive interference. This pattern is also consistent with developmental
models highlighting adolescence as an important period for socio-af-
fective learning (Crone and Dahl, 2012; Schriber and Guyer, 2016).
4.1.1.2. Emotional memory. Unlike the well-documented memory-
enhancing effects of emotion in adulthood (LaBar and Cabeza, 2006),
relatively little is understood to date about how emotional memory
develops and whether this is present early in development or changes
over time (Hamann and Stevens, 2013). Understanding the
development and integration of emotion and memory systems
advances our understanding of typical emotional memory
development and maladaptive memory processes, such as overgeneral
memory formation which is associated with a range of mental health
problems (Dalgleish and Werner-Seidler, 2014). The literature on
emotional memory in children comes from naturalistic investigations
as well as from a growing body of more controlled laboratory
experiments. Evidence from memory for actual events shows that
children, like adults, remember emotional events better than neutral
ones (Ackil et al., 2003; Goodman et al., 2010). For example, children
who lived through a tornado were more likely to remember the event
than other neutral events (Ackil et al., 2003). Nine years after the
tornado children who were youngest at the time of the event
remembered the greatest proportion of emotional versus neutral
events with the proportion decreasing with age (Bauer et al., 2017).
Laboratory evidence shows a similar pattern (Vasa et al., 2011),
although not all studies show an emotional enhancement effect
(Leventon and Bauer, 2016) and some even showed reduced memory
for emotional material (Howe et al., 2010).
6 Existing literature covers the complex effects of stress on processes such as
attention, learning, and memory, and the temporal actions of two major stress
mediators, in particular catecholamines and glucocorticoids (Henckens et al.,
2009; Hermans et al., 2014; Joëls et al., 2011; Schwabe and Wolf, 2014; Solstad
et al., 2006; van Ast et al., 2013; Weymar et al., 2013b, 2014; Weymar et al.,
2012). Furthermore, given that stress mediates both initial and subsequent
stages of processing influencing learning and memory, from increased vigilance
to retrieval, pharmacological interventions or new neurostimulation methods
(transcutaneous vagal nerve stimulation, Van Leusden et al., 2015; Ventura-
Bort et al., 2018) that target either or both stress systems at these stages of
processing might be useful for future prevention and treatment (de Quervain
et al., 2017).
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The absence of an enhancement effect observed in some studies has
been proposed to reflect an emergent integration of memory and
emotion systems across development. In support of this, Leventon et al.
(2014) reported an absence of enhanced recognition performance in
both younger (5–7.5 years), and older (8–9 years) groups. The older
group, however, showed event-related potential during the recognition
of negative memoranda that was distinct (enhanced LPP for negative
items) from neutral items (Leventon et al., 2014). Functional neuroi-
maging of emotion memory in young people has shown the recruitment
of the same neural substrates in the AMY-HC complex, the inferior
temporal lobe, and the ACC (Krauel et al., 2007; Nelson et al., 2003;
Vasa et al., 2011). However, subtle differences exist when comparing
patterns of activation with adults, including greater AMY activation and
more wide-spread activation during the encoding of emotional in-
formation (Nelson et al., 2003; Vasa et al., 2011). It should be noted,
however, that no studies included children younger than 9 years and
the samples were small.
Together, these studies suggest that emotion-attention interactions
and underlying neural substrates undergo important maturational
changes in childhood and adolescence. Most of the findings, however,
have been documented using cross-sectional designs and, as such, there
remains a need to replicate these results using longitudinal follow-up
studies that assess changes in behavior as well as neural structure and
function. Children, compared to adolescents and adults, tend to exhibit
greater interference to emotional distracters. They also tend to exhibit
enhanced memory for emotional compared to neutral events. Studies
examining the connectivity between PFC regions supporting cognitive
control processes suggest that short-range connections tend to become
weaker with age, whereas long-range connections, which are important
for integration across networks, become stronger with age (Fair et al.,
2007). Thus, it is possible that underlying attention, memory, and
emotion systems may become more integrated and parsimonious across
development into adulthood.
4.1.2. Later stages: aging
Aging is not only associated with well-known co-morbidities and
losses but also with relatively high levels of emotional well-being.
Considerable evidence supports the idea of an age-related positivity
effect in emotional attention, perception, and memory, by which older
adults tend to (a) pay greater attention to, process, and remember more
positive information, and (b) show reduced processing of negative in-
formation compared to younger adults (Mather, 2016; Reed and
Carstensen, 2012). According to the Socioemotional Selectivity Theory
(Reed and Carstensen, 2012), older adults’ preference for positive over
negative information is driven by their prioritization of more present-
focused motivational goals related to emotional meaning and satisfac-
tion, which in turn enhances their well-being. This suggests that age-
related differences in emotion processing occur as a function of differ-
ential engagement of the top-down mechanisms, such as emotion reg-
ulation strategies, that allow older adults to spontaneously cope with
emotional challenges (Dolcos et al., 2014; Mather and Carstensen,
2005). As discussed below, available evidence regarding the neural
correlates of age differences in emotion-cognition interactions points to
relatively preserved bottom-up (AMY) mechanisms and enhanced top-
down (PFC) mechanisms.
4.1.2.1. Age-related differences in emotion perception. Supporting the
idea that age differences in emotion processing are primarily linked
to modulation of top-down/controlled mechanisms, there is evidence
suggesting that bottom-up/automatic processing of emotional stimuli is
relatively preserved in aging (Dolcos et al., 2014; Katsumi et al., 2019b;
St Jacques et al., 2010). Such preservation of sensitivity to basic
emotional information in aging has been most consistently associated
with similar engagement of AMY in young and older adults, which also
seems to show less structural decline as a function of age compared to
other brain regions (e.g., Jiang et al., 2014). In the context of overall
preserved AMY functioning in aging (which is particularly sensitive to
high arousing/threatening stimuli), there is also evidence showing age
differences in AMY sensitivity to the valence of stimuli. Previous studies
of emotional perception identified decreased AMY response to negative
stimuli (Iidaka et al., 2002; Mather et al., 2004) or increased AMY
response to positive stimuli (Kehoe et al., 2013; Mather et al., 2004), in
older compared to young adults.
Furthermore, increased engagement of the mPFC and ACC regions
during the viewing of negative vs. neutral and positive vs. negative
stimuli has also been reported in older adults (Dolcos et al., 2014;
Nashiro et al., 2012; St Jacques et al., 2010). These findings, along with
evidence for chronic activation of emotion regulation goals in aging
(Gross et al., 1997), suggest that greater activity in the mPFC/ACC
regions linked to emotional perception may reflect enhanced habitual
engagement of emotion regulation strategies in older adults, which may
further exert modulation of activity in basic emotion processing regions
(AMY). Consistent with this idea, there is evidence for increased func-
tional connectivity between the ACC and AMY in healthy older adults,
who also show overall lower emotional ratings of negative stimuli (St
Jacques et al., 2010). This idea was further supported by recent evi-
dence identifying activity in similar mPFC/ACC areas showing a ne-
gative association with subjective emotional ratings for negative stimuli
in older adults (Dolcos et al., 2014), thus confirming a role of this re-
gion in effective spontaneous regulation of negative emotions in aging
(see also Dolcos et al., 2017a). Notably, this study also clarified that the
observed effects were specific to processing of low arousing stimuli,
thus highlighting the importance of taking into consideration the level
of emotional charge when investigating emotion processing in aging.
4.1.2.2. Age-related differences in emotional distraction and
memory. Differences in emotion processing in older adulthood also
extend to differences in emotional distraction and emotional memory.
Regarding emotional distraction, consistent with a positivity bias in
emotion processing, evidence suggests that older adults are less easily
distracted by negative emotional stimuli compared to younger adults
(Mather, 2012). For example, in an emotional Stroop study, younger
adults were slower in naming the color of neutral words that followed
negative words, while older adults did not show this effect (Ashley and
Swick, 2009). Another study showed that, when asked to identify a
target number displayed over a distracter face, younger adults were
most distracted by angry faces, while older adults were most distracted
by happy faces (Ebner and Johnson, 2010). Additionally, a recent study
found that older adults in a positive mood induction group showed
enhanced memory for previous distraction compared to those in a
neutral mood group (Biss et al., 2012). Consistent with previously
mentioned evidence on the neural correlates of emotional perception in
aging, fMRI evidence from older adults have shown greater ACC
engagement in response to irrelevant positive faces than irrelevant
neutral faces when attention to the central face location was high,
whereas this pattern was not found in younger adults (Brassen et al.,
2011). Regarding emotional memory, both younger and older adults
showed the memory enhancement by negative information, although
this effect was larger in the former group (St Jacques et al., 2009). At
the neural level, consistent with the behavioral effect and also with the
literature on emotion perception, both age groups showed greater AMY
activity associated with subsequent memory for negative vs. neutral
stimuli. Moreover, the same study also identified increased and
decreased activity in the dlPFC and visual cortex, respectively, in
older adults linked to subsequent memory for negative vs. neutral
pictures. These findings are overall consistent with existing models of
cognitive aging (e.g., Posterior-Anterior Shift in Aging; Davis et al.,
2008), and suggest that greater PFC activity associated with older
adults’ emotional encoding might reflect enhanced engagement of
spontaneous emotion regulation.
Finally, there is also evidence that older adults have greater sus-
ceptibility compared to younger adults to the aforementioned memory
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trade-off effect between emotional/central vs. non-emotional/periph-
eral aspects of an event (Kensinger et al., 2007; Nashiro and Mather,
2011). These age-related differences have been associated with older
adults’ relatively decreased tendency to engage in particular encoding
strategies (e.g., broad allocation of attention to contextual features of
stimuli) that help younger adults reduce the negative influence of the
trade-off effect. This suggests that older adults may have particular
difficulty in disengaging attention from emotionally salient features of
stimuli (Kensinger et al., 2007, 2005). Furthermore, there is evidence
that emotional arousal enhances memory for information about in-
trinsically-linked contextual aspects (e.g., stimuli and their location)
through memory binding in younger adults but not in older adults, thus
suggesting that possibly limited cognitive resources in older adults may
lead them to remember only the gist but not the associated details
(Nashiro and Mather, 2011).
In summary, available evidence suggests that emotion-attention
interactions and the associated neural substrates are altered throughout
childhood, adolescence, younger and older adulthood. Children tend to
show greater interference by emotional distracters compared to ado-
lescents and adults, and enhanced memory for emotional compared to
neutral events. Older adults tend to show a positivity bias in perceiving
emotional information, in the context of preserved emotion processing.
This results in reduced distraction by negative emotional stimuli and
diminished impact of negative valence on emotional memories. In ad-
dition, there is also greater susceptibility to the memory trade-off effect
between emotional/central vs. non-emotional/peripheral aspects of
events, compared to young adults. At the neural level, children tend to
show greater AMY activation along with more wide-spread activation
while processing emotional information, whereas older adults tend to
show decreased AMY response to negative stimuli and increased re-
sponse to positive stimuli. These basic emotion processing responses are
coupled with increased responses in regions associated with cognitive
control of emotion (PFC and medial frontal/ACC regions) during
emotion processing, particularly of negatively-valenced stimuli, which
also influences emotional distraction and emotional memory. These
findings highlight emotion-attention interactions across the life span, as
well as the associated interactions between bottom-up (AMY) and top-
down (PFC/ACC) neural mechanisms.
4.2. Sex differences
4.2.1. Emotional attention and perception
In our society, it is commonly believed that women perceive, ex-
perience, and express emotions to a greater extent than men do (Briton
and Hall, 1995; Meyers-Levy and Loken, 2015). This section discusses
scientific evidence pointing to both beneficial and detrimental aspects
related to the role of sex differences in emotion processing. Consistent
with the beneficial aspects, there is evidence pointing to enhanced
emotional competence in women compared to men (Collignon et al.,
2010; Hall and Matsumoto, 2004). Women pay more attention to, as
well as identify and decode others’ emotional expressions more accu-
rately (Collignon et al., 2010; Hall and Matsumoto, 2004), are more
emotionally expressive (Kring and Gordon, 1998), and display more
extensive knowledge of emotional experience (Barrett et al., 2000) than
men. However, there is also evidence highlighting increased vulnerability
to affective disorders in women, who are known to exhibit enhanced
reactivity to emotional stimuli, particularly negative ones (Hamann and
Canli, 2004; Spalek et al., 2015). In addition, women tend to be more
cautious and show avoidance-focused motivations (Meyers-Levy and
Loken, 2015), which may be linked to nearly two times higher lifetime
prevalence of mood and anxiety disorders than in men (Bekker and van
Mens-Verhulst, 2007; Kessler, 2003).
At the neural level, available findings identify both general and
specific sex differences in the patterns of brain activations during
emotion processing, and provide evidence consistent with a negative
affective bias in emotion processing in women. A recent meta-analysis of
brain imaging studies examining sex differences identified a sex× va-
lence interaction in emotion processing, such that women are more
likely to show greater AMY response to negative information, whereas
men tend to show greater AMY response to positive information
(Stevens and Hamann, 2012). Moreover, a subsequent study by
Andreano et al. (2014) showed that AMY response to negative stimuli
tends to be “persistent” over multiple repetitions in women, whereas
AMY response to negative stimuli in men is only sensitive when the
stimuli are novel (as opposed to familiar). This finding lends support to
the idea that reduced habituation of AMY response to negative stimuli
may be linked to the greater incidence of affective disorders in women
(Andreano et al., 2014).
Interestingly, previous brain imaging studies of sex differences have
also identified patterns of hemispheric lateralization in brain activity
linked to emotion processing (Killgore and Yurgelun-Todd, 2001;
Williams et al., 2005), as well as differential sensitivity to contextual
factors. For instance, compared to women, men showed greater activity
in the right AMY during an emotional face perception task (Schneider
et al., 2011), and similar lateralization differences in AMY activity have
also been identified in the memory domain (Cahill et al., 2001; Canli
et al., 2002; see also the next section). Furthermore, additional evi-
dence regarding sex-related hemispheric lateralization effects has been
identified by studies examining ERP responses, in which the authors
found an asymmetrical activation of the visual cortex between men and
women during an emotional face judgment task, characterized by right
hemisphere-dominant P1 and N1 responses in men compared to women
(Proverbio et al., 2006).
In sum, available evidence concerning sex differences in the effect of
emotion points to women’s enhanced sensitivity to emotional stimuli in
general, and to negative stimuli in particular. Although women gen-
erally exhibit enhanced emotional competence in emotion processing,
compared to men, they are also more likely to show a negative affective
bias in attention and perception. At the neural level, women’s nega-
tivity bias in emotional perception has been linked to increased sensi-
tivity in the bottom-up emotion processing regions including the AMY,
which may, in turn, be linked to heightened vulnerability to emotional
disturbances in women. Evidence also points to the existence of hemi-
spheric lateralization linked to emotion processing, with men and
women typically exhibiting enhanced activity in the right vs. left
hemisphere, respectively.
4.2.2. Emotional distraction and emotional memory
4.2.2.1. Sex differences in emotional distraction. Possibly linked to the
increased susceptibility to affective disorders in women compared to
men (Bekker and van Mens-Verhulst, 2007; Kessler, 2003), women also
show enhanced reactivity to emotional challenges (Hamann and Canli,
2004; Shields, 1991) and specificity in the deployment of emotion
regulation strategies (Denkova et al., 2012; Mcrae et al., 2008). Given
the possibility that the same mechanisms that help generate the
enhanced emotional experience in women could also be partially
responsible for enhanced sensitivity to emotional challenges, in a
recent investigation Iordan et al. (2013a) examined whether sex
differences in basic emotional reactivity are also associated with
differences in emotional distractibility.
First, consistent with the idea of increased bottom-up impact of
emotional distraction in women relative to men, women showed in-
creased sensitivity to emotional distraction in brain regions associated
with emotion processing, such as FG and AMY. Supporting the idea of
enhanced bottom-up effects in women, the left FG, a perceptual area
susceptible to modulation by emotion, showed increased activity in
response to angry-face distracters in female participants as well as a
negative correlation with WM performance. Increased response to
emotional distraction in women relative to men was also identified in
the subgenual ACC, a higher-level emotion integration region, which
has been linked to the experience of negative emotion, in both healthy
and clinical samples (Baeken et al., 2010; Mobbs et al., 2009). These sex
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differences in the basic response to emotional distraction are consistent
with increased sensitivity in ‘bottom-up’ responses in women, linked to
impaired WM performance. However, they were identified in the con-
text of overall similar brain response to emotional distraction in women
and men, suggesting that, at a more general level, men and women also
deploy similar mechanisms in response to emotional distraction.
Second, the same investigation also identified sex differences in coping
with emotional distraction. Results revealed a dorsal-ventral hemi-
spheric dissociation within the lateral PFC, with the left ventral PFC
being linked to individual differences in WM performance in women,
and the right dorsal PFC being linked to individual differences in men.
Interestingly, the same left vlPFC region showing enhanced activation
in the female participants who performed better in the WM task
(Denkova et al., 2010) showed ‘by default’ overall increased level of
activity in males, who also had overall higher levels of WM perfor-
mance.
Overall, these results support the idea that enhanced emotional
competence in women may have the side-effect of increased emotional
reactivity, which in turn may lead to enhanced emotional distract-
ibility. This brain imaging evidence points to sex differences in both
bottom-up and top-down effects of emotional distraction, by linking
increased recruitment of emotion processing areas with decreased
cognitive performance in women and by revealing dissociations be-
tween women and men in the mechanisms of coping with distraction.
Hence, investigating the role of sex differences that mediate both basic
responses to and the ability to cope with emotional challenge offers a
promising path for better understanding differential susceptibility to
affective disorders in women and men.
4.2.2.2. Sex differences in emotional memory. There is also evidence that
women display more extensive knowledge of emotional experience
(Barrett et al., 2000) and recall more emotional autobiographical
memories (Davis, 1999; Seidlitz and Diener, 1998) than men do.
Complementing the evidence discussed above, neuroanatomical
research also revealed sex differences in emotion-related brain
regions (e.g., AMY and orbitofrontal cortex volumes) (Goldstein et al.,
2001; Gur et al., 2002). Consistent with behavioral and
neuroanatomical evidence suggesting differences between men and
women, evidence from brain imaging studies also pointed to sex
differences in the involvement of the AMY in emotional memory
(e.g., Andreano and Cahill, 2009; Hamann, 2005). One such notable
difference points to hemispheric asymmetry in the role of the AMY in
emotional memory encoding (e.g., Cahill et al., 2001; Canli et al.,
2002), with left AMY being associated with successful emotional
memory encoding in women and right AMY being associated with
successful emotional memory encoding in men (but see Fischer et al.,
2007). Interestingly, this hemispheric lateralization seems to be
confined to the basolateral AMY, and observed following a longer (2
weeks) but not shorter (minutes) retention interval (Mackiewicz et al.,
2006), which suggests that this lateralization is influenced by memory
consolidation processes (see also Talmi et al., 2008). Further
investigation of sex differences in AMY’s involvement during
emotional memory encoding suggests that feminine and masculine
roles as established by the society, rather than the sex per se, seem to
influence these differences in emotional memory (Cahill et al., 2004).
Overall, the evidence regarding sex differences in emotional
memory points to hemispheric differences in the role of the AMY during
emotional memory encoding and consolidation, and suggests that
taking into account the social dimension and gender-specific societal
roles is of particular interest in understanding differences between
women and men (Cahill et al., 2004).
4.3. Personality and clinical differences
The impact of emotion on attentional processes appears to occur
differently across the population. To comprehensively take such
variability into account, it is important to investigate aspects such as
personality differences and clinical status. Personality neuroscience is
an emerging field that contributes to clarifying aspects regarding the
role of personality differences in understanding vulnerability and resi-
lience to emotional dysregulation (Canli, 2004; DeYoung et al., 2010),
with important implications for understanding both healthy and clinical
functioning. Here, we focus on two of the most well-documented per-
sonality traits, anxiety and depression, that not only modulate how
emotional stimuli compete for our attention, but also in their own right
seem to disrupt aspects of the attentional system. These traits are also
the target of emerging interventions discussed in Section 5, and of
models and theories that show how individual differences in other
domains, such as regulatory focus, are associated with indicators of
well-being (Eddington et al., 2007, 2009; Higgins et al., 2012;
Llewellyn et al., 2013). Other personality traits (extraversion, neuroti-
cism) can also influence emotion processing and its interactions with
executive functions (Canli, 2004; Forster et al., 2015; Rohr et al., 2015),
but are not the focus of the present discussion.
4.3.1. Trait anxiety
A hallmark characteristic of individuals with high anxiety (either as
a trait factor of high nervousness/worry, or at a clinical level) are se-
lective biases within attention towards emotional information, specifi-
cally threat-laden content (Dudeney et al., 2015; Okon-Singer et al.,
2011). For example, anxious individuals have difficulty ignoring threat-
denoting distracter words in emotional Stroop tasks (Williams et al.,
1996), as well as angry/fearful faces in dot probe paradigms (e.g.,
Rudaizky et al., 2014). Moreover, this bias extends beyond the alloca-
tion of attention to the level of WM: anxious individuals appear to
prioritize visual WM capacity towards encoding threat-laden content,
even if it is task-irrelevant, at the expense of other information to
memorize (Stout et al., 2015, 2013). Both children and adults with
anxious disposition, like many patients with anxiety disorders, tend to
excessively allocate attention to threat-related cues when they are
present in the environment, even when they are irrelevant to the task at
hand (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Dudeney et al., 2015).
Such findings have led to numerous theoretical accounts positing
that these biases relate to automatic facilitation of attention towards
threat in anxiety (see Cisler and Koster, 2010). This is also supported by
neuroscientific evidence that threat detection and processing is typi-
cally reflected in increased neural activity within the AMY (e.g., Davis
and Whalen, 2001), and that anxious individuals similarly show in-
creased AMY response to threat-related distracter stimuli (e.g., Bishop
et al., 2007). Finally, there is some evidence that emotional biases in
attention seen amongst anxious individuals may in fact causally relate
to the development of anxious symptomatology. As discussed in the last
section, recent cognitive intervention methods, such as attentional bias
modification (ABM) training, have shown that attentional biases to
threat can diminish as a result of training individuals to divert their
attention away from threat-laden stimuli in the visual environment.
Additionally, it has been found that self-report levels of anxiety also
attenuate as a result of such training (see MacLeod and Mathews,
2012), suggesting that, while attentional biases in anxiety are seen as a
classic symptom, they may also relate as a root contributing factor to
anxious disposition.
While anxiety appears to exacerbate some of the emotional biases in
attention in relation to threat, anxiety in its own right also appears to
modulate the attention network. Across a range of selective attention
measures, anxious individuals show heightened distractibility by task-
irrelevant stimuli, suggesting an impaired inhibition function (e.g.,
Berggren and Derakshan, 2013b, 2014). Supporting this, neuroscientific
investigations have shown that anxious individuals recruit areas of the
PFC associated with attentional control differently compared to low
anxious individuals during tasks requiring distracter inhibition (e.g.,
Basten et al., 2012). Findings such as these are accommodated within
the influential Attentional Control Theory (ACT) (Eysenck et al., 2007),
F. Dolcos, et al. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 108 (2020) 559–601
576
which proposes that anxiety may impair three key functions of atten-
tional control: inhibition, flexible shifting between tasks, and updating
of information within WM (Miyake et al., 2000). In addition, this re-
duction in top-down control of attention may increase the bottom-up
saliency of other information, hence resulting in high difficulty to
maintain goal-focused attention.
An open question is whether evidence of reduced attentional control
in anxiety can explain why such individuals also show enhanced biases
to threat-related information? Growing neuroscientific evidence sug-
gests that both functional and structural connectivity between pre-
frontal areas involved in attentional control and limbic areas related to
emotional responses is reduced in anxious populations (e.g., Kim et al.,
2011). Moreover, cognitive training interventions targeting attentional
control efficiency have produced both reductions in attentional control
impairments in anxiety and attenuated self-report feelings of worry
(Sari et al., 2016).
In summary, anxiety appears to differentially influence attention
and its relationship with emotion. On the one hand, accumulating
evidence shows that attentional control is disrupted in high anxiety,
while conversely emotion processing appears enhanced particularly in
relation to threat. Supported by neuroscientific work, these findings
suggest a trade-off between the efficiency of prefrontal brain regions
associated with attentional control vs. relatively enhanced response
within the limbic and sensory network related to threat detection. Much
progress has been made particularly in targeting these two networks
through ABM and attentional control training to reduce anxious
symptomatology, and combined dual-pronged training approaches may
provide promise against a backdrop where current cognitive-behavioral
treatments of anxiety typically report an efficacy rate of only 30–50%
(Taylor et al., 2012).
4.3.2. Trait depression
Within depressed groups, including those of high trait dysphoria,
rumination, and clinical depression, emotional interactions with at-
tention appear to more generally encompass attentional biases to ne-
gative information than the relatively threat-specific idiosyncrasies of
anxiety. Individuals with high depressive symptoms show difficulty
ignoring and rejecting negative information (e.g., De Raedt and Koster,
2010; Joormann, 2004), which has been proposed to explain why such
individuals typically experience depressive symptoms due to a simple
difficulty in rejecting such thoughts and behaviors (Joormann, 2004).
As with anxiety, however, impaired ability to ignore distraction also
occurs for non-emotional material across clinically depressed and at-
risk groups (e.g., Beckwe et al., 2014; Owens et al., 2012). Such findings
have led to similar emphasis on attentional control as in anxiety (e.g.,
Koster et al., 2017). Moreover, neuroscientific evidence has similarly
shown that depression links to aberrant neural response in areas of PFC
linked to attentional control (e.g., Davidson et al., 2002), increased
AMY response to presented negative stimuli (e.g., Siegle et al., 2007b),
and reduced connectivity between these areas when viewing such
images (e.g., Almeida et al., 2009). Finally, as in the case of anxiety,
cognitive interventions targeting attentional control in depressive
groups have demonstrated improvements in regulating negative emo-
tional material (e.g., Iacoviello et al., 2014), as well as some evidence of
reductions to self-reported depressive symptoms following active
training (Segrave et al., 2014). Such methods provide promise as new
intervention techniques for depression where current treatments fall
short given high remittance rates within clinical practice (e.g., over
20%; Driessen et al., 2013).
In summary, at the clinical level, anxiety and depression typically
have a high comorbidity rate (Hirschfeld, 2001), and research ex-
amining emotion-attention interactions within these populations high-
light clear similarities in the potential mechanisms underlying the role
of these characteristics. Whether specifically for threat or negative
events in general, emotion consumes and perhaps also compromises
attention, while poor attention may equally play a causal role in the
ability to regulate such emotions. This interplay has led to promising
developments in cognitive interventions targeting these mechanisms,
although with regimens often focused on emotional regulation or at-
tentional control in isolation. Consideration of the reciprocal links be-
tween emotion and attention in relation to personality factors may yield
new insight and opportunities for ameliorating chronic negative affect
within the general population.
4.4. Clinical anxiety and depression
A growing number of studies have documented alterations in the
functioning of fronto-limbic systems supporting modulation of atten-
tion to emotional information in individuals diagnosed with or at risk of
developing anxiety or depression. There is growing evidence that at-
tentional biases or stimulus-driven attention toward or away from
specific emotional information could contribute to the onset and pre-
valence of these disorders (Jacobs et al., 2008; Lau and Waters, 2017).
Attentional bias emerges through heightened activity in limbic regions
(e.g., AMY, insula) signaling the need to modulate cortical regions (e.g.,
ACC, TPJ). If the information is irrelevant to their current goal or
context, goal-directed attention, supported by PFC areas (dlPFC, mPFC/
ACC, orbitofrontal cortex), re-directs or maintains attention to task-
relevant stimuli (Pessoa, 2017). Although attentional biases to threat-
related information have been primarily associated with anxiety (Cisler
and Koster, 2010), biased attention to negative stimuli is also char-
acteristic of depression (Peckham et al., 2010).
Regarding anxiety disorders, cognitive theories have put forward
different accounts to explain attentional biases to threat, some sug-
gesting a bias toward or away from threat-related information
(Kaufman et al., 1997), whereas other highlight the role of cognitive
control processes in the monitoring and regulation of attention
(Derryberry and Reed, 2002). There is agreement, however, that such
alterations could be both a vulnerability factor that leads to the de-
velopment of anxiety disorders (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) and an im-
portant contributing factor to the maintenance of anxiety disorders
(Williams et al., 1997). Consistent with this idea, perhaps the most
systematic finding in individuals with clinical anxiety (Monk et al.,
2008) links individual differences in anxiety to negative coupling of
frontal and AMY regions (i.e., fronto-AMY connectivity). Turning to
depression, extensive research has also revealed patterns of emotional
biases in basic cognitive processes, also known as cognitive biases in
depression (Gotlib and Joormann, 2010). These include attentional and
memory biases whereby there is increased processing of negative in-
formation at the expense of neutral and positive information (Gotlib
and Joormann, 2010; Winer and Salem, 2016). Cognitive (Beck, 1967)
and emotional theories (Clark, 2005) maintain that individuals who are
experiencing depression and who are at risk for the disorder exhibit
attentional biases, whereby they preferentially attend toward negative
stimuli and away from positive stimuli in their environment (Joorman
et al., 2007; Owens et al., 2016). The next sections discuss evidence
regarding such biases in clinical anxiety and depression.
4.4.1. Visual perception and working memory in clinical anxiety
Although individual differences in the way we experience our sur-
roundings are normal, extremely biased perception may be dysfunc-
tional in psychopathology. Evidence shows that individuals with clin-
ical anxiety manifest perception biases when presented with
threatening stimuli compared to non-threatening ones. For example,
participants with high levels of acrophobic symptoms were asked to
estimate the height of a balcony while they stood on a high building
themselves. Highly fearful participants estimated the balcony to be
higher than the less fearful participants. Notably, the less fearful par-
ticipants also overestimated the height (Teachman et al., 2008), sug-
gesting a general perception bias that might be related to biological
preparedness (see Aue et al., 2016, 2013, for similar findings related to
attention bias to spiders among participants with low fear levels). A
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similar bias was shown in state anxiety – in a different study (Stefanucci
et al., 2008), participants were asked to stand on a skateboard (which
was shown to provoke fear) or on a stable wooden box (control group)
on top of a hill and to estimate the steepness of the hill. Individuals
standing on a skateboard estimated the hill as steeper than those
standing on a wooden box. A related kind of perception bias was shown
in arachnophobia. For example, Vasey et al. (2012) asked spider-phobic
participants to estimate the size of a spider and concluded that size
estimation biases correlate with the level of fear of spiders, so that the
higher the phobia from spiders was, the larger the spider was perceived.
Together, these findings demonstrate that estimation bias exists both
when anxiety is acute and when it is dispositional, and it is exacerbated
in clinical anxiety. Perception biases may be related to other well-
documented processing biases, such as attention, expectancy, inter-
pretation and memory biases. However, the correlational and causal
relations between them are unclear, although both attention and per-
ception biases are thought to affect early stages of processing. Further
research is also needed to clarify the neural mechanisms that mediate
perceptual biases.
Turning to WM, individuals with, or even those who are prone to,
emotional disorders such as anxiety and depression, present an ex-
aggerated effect of inefficient gating of threat from WM (Stout et al.,
2013) that disrupts endogenous attention and other control mechan-
isms. Specifically, when anxious individuals are asked to encode in-
formation into WM, both non-affective and threat-related distracters
interfere with performance. The heightened negative affect (i.e., an-
xiety, sadness) characterizing these populations may be partially ex-
plained by this deficit (Cohen et al., 2014; Stout et al., 2017). For ex-
ample, anxious individuals tend to experience invasive thoughts and
distress, even when the threat is utterly irrelevant to the current task or
even when it is not present in the external environment, perhaps due to
allocation of excess storage capacity to real or imagined threat
(Shackman et al., 2016). When threat-related information penetrates
into WM, it distorts information processing (i.e., attention, memory
retrieval, and response), thus promoting rumination, worry, and other
dysfunctional cognitions (Thiruchselvam et al., 2012).
Notably, influences between cognition and emotion are bi-direc-
tional (Dolcos and Denkova, 2014; Dolcos et al., 2011; Dolcos et al.,
2017a; Okon-Singer et al., 2015), and thus there are tight links between
WM and current emotional states that are manifested in overlapping
brain circuits involved in attention and WM, that are also crucial for
emotion regulation (Etkin et al., 2015). For example, cognitive re-
appraisal, a prevalent strategy for emotion regulation, requires effortful
maintenances of explicit regulatory goal and depends on a WM circuit
including the lateral PFC and posterior parietal cortices (Buhle et al.,
2014). Consistent with this notion, individual differences in WM ca-
pacity are predictive of reappraisal success (Etkin et al., 2015). Fur-
thermore, mood-congruent representations are activated in WM during
negative mood, arousing persistent negative thoughts, selective atten-
tion to negative stimuli and biased recall and processing of negative
memories (Rolls, 2013; Siemer, 2005). When humans attempt to reg-
ulate and repair their negative mood, they do so by trying to control the
content of WM by elaborating more positive thoughts and memories.
These attempts fail in populations with emotional disorders, and thus
their deficient ability to control WM results in a “self-defeating cycle” of
increasingly negative thinking and intensifying negative affect
(Joormann, 2010).
4.4.2. Attentional/executive control in depression
Depression is a highly debilitating affective disorder which is
characterized by sustained negative affect and anhedonia. Cognitive
symptoms typically include patterns of negative thinking about the self,
the world, and the future, as well as disturbances at the level of cog-
nitive processes such as memory, concentration, and attention
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Although disturbances at the
level of cognitive processes have oftentimes been considered secondary
features of negative mood, theories of depression increasingly consider
them to be a major factor that contributes to the maintenance and ex-
acerbation of depressive symptoms (Disner et al., 2011; Millan et al.,
2012). Typically two classes of disrupted cognitive processes are dis-
tinguished in the context of depression: cognitive biases and general
attentional/executive control (see Gotlib and Joormann, 2010). Below
we briefly describe each of these disturbances in more details.
Cognitive biases refer to the tendency to selectively process negative
affective information over neutral or more positive information.
Cognitive biases have been investigated at the level of attention, in-
terpretation, and memory. Past studies have used behavioral tasks (e.g.
Emotional Stroop, Dot Probe, and Posner Cueing task), as well as eye
tracking paradigms to examine attentional processing of affective in-
formation in depression. Overall, these studies seem to suggest that
later, but not early, attentional processes are impaired in depression
(for a review see De Raedt and Koster, 2010). More specifically, de-
pression is associated with impaired disengagement from negative, self-
referential information, and depressed individuals also pay less atten-
tion to positive information than non-depressed individuals. Interest-
ingly, several prospective studies have shown that such attentional
biases are associated with slower recovery from stress (Sanchez et al.,
2013) and sustained negative mood (Clasen et al., 2013). Interpretation
biases have been investigated with a wide range of different tasks,
where typically ambiguous information is presented and researchers
assess whether this information is interpreted systematically in a posi-
tive or a negative manner (see Hirsch et al., 2016). A recent meta-
analysis of this body of research (Everaert et al., 2017b) showed that
depression is associated with a tendency to interpret information in a
more negative manner. However, this was only found on measures re-
lying on self-report, but not on tasks with more implicit dependent
variables (RTs or psychophysiological responses). Finally, memory
biases are the most well-established biases in depression, with evidence
pointing to better explicit memory for negative information (Matt et al.,
1992), and there is also evidence of overgeneral autobiographical
memory in depression (Williams et al., 2007).
Moreover, an extensive body of work examined more general ex-
ecutive functions in depression. Although there is quite a bit of het-
erogeneity among different individual studies, a recent meta-analysis
indicates that depressed individuals show broad deficits in a host of
tasks measuring executive functions (Snyder, 2013). Cognitive theories
of depression have argued that various aspects of executive functioning
(switching, inhibition, and updating) are impaired in depression, which
influences the capacity to regulate emotions (Joormann and
Vanderlind, 2014). These ideas have received some empirical support
(Everaert et al., 2017a, b). Interestingly, there is also emerging research
that examines the causal influence of executive functions on depression
and emotion regulation. Several studies have shown that extensive
training of cognitive control can reduce levels of rumination and de-
pressive symptoms (see Koster et al., 2017). This research is described
in more detail below (section 5). Despite a large body of studies es-
tablishing an association between depression and executive functions,
less research has been devoted to the origins of impaired performance
on tasks measuring executive functions. Moreover it is unclear how
motivational factors, that are assigned a key role in basic models of
cognitive control (Botvinick and Braver, 2015), play a role in depres-
sion-related cognitive impairments (Grahek et al., 2018).
4.5. Trauma- and stress-related disorders
As discussed in the preceding sections, emotion can either enhance
or hinder various aspects of our cognition and behavior. For instance,
the emotional charge of an event can increase attention to and memory
for that event (Dolcos et al., 2017b), whereas task-irrelevant emotional
information may lead to increased distraction away from goal-relevant
tasks (Iordan et al., 2013b). Changes in affective and cognitive pro-
cessing are critical features in PTSD patients, typically reflected in
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increased emotional reactivity and recollection of traumatic memories,
along with impaired cognitive/executive control (Rauch et al., 2006;
Shin and Liberzon, 2009). This section focuses on emerging evidence
linked to the role of specific emotion regulation strategies whose al-
tered interactions with attentional processes seem to be central to the
PTSD symptomatology. Of particular importance is also emerging evi-
dence concerning the impact that such alterations have on the way
emotional memories (Hall et al., 2018; Hayes et al., 2011) and emo-
tional distraction (Morey et al., 2009) are processed in PTSD, and on
the associated neural mechanisms (Dolcos, 2013).
4.5.1. Attentional control, emotion regulation, and PTSD
Emotion regulation deficits are commonly observed in those who
experience symptoms of post-traumatic stress (for a review see
Seligowski et al., 2015) and emotion regulation capacity predicts the
onset and maintenance of post-traumatic stress symptoms following
trauma, as shown in several prospective studies using self-report mea-
sures of emotion regulation in young people (Jenness et al., 2016;
Punamäki et al., 2015), as well as psychophysiological measures of
emotion regulation during a behavioral emotion regulation task in ve-
terans (Fitzgerald et al., 2018). Differences in emotion regulation ca-
pacity also appear to be good predictors of treatment response to both
psychological (e.g., prolonged exposure therapy) and psychopharma-
cological (e.g., selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors) interventions
(Jerud et al., 2016; MacNamara et al., 2016). Despite this accumulating
evidence, there is no unified theory of the role of emotion regulation in
the development and maintenance of PTSD.
Regarding attentional control in PTSD, given this review’s focus on
the interplay between affective and attentional processes, we explore
the role of attentional control in the association between emotion
regulation capacity and PTSD. Attentional control has been proposed as
a top-down control mechanism (Eysenck et al., 2007) that overrides
implicit biases in attentional processing that favor threat-related in-
formation in those at risk for anxiety-related problems (Bar-Haim et al.,
2007). Self-reported attentional control (Derryberry and Reed, 2002)
has been associated with fewer post-traumatic stress symptoms over a
1–3 month interval in individuals who experienced a stressful event
during this period (Bardeen et al., 2015). Behavioral measures of at-
tentional control show a more complex relation with PTSD, through the
impact of attentional control on attentional biases. A study in trauma-
exposed college students showed threat-related attentional bias, mea-
sured as the time spent looking at threatening images when presented
with neutral/threat pairings, to be predicted by the interaction between
self-reported attentional control and levels of post-traumatic stress
symptoms (Bardeen and Orcutt, 2011). Individuals with high levels of
both attentional control and symptoms of post-traumatic stress dwelled
less on threatening images, but not individuals low in attentional con-
trol and symptoms of PTSD. The authors interpreted these findings as
evidence for the adverse effects of habitual avoidance of negative in-
formation. Interestingly, Schoorl et al. (2014) showed the exact oppo-
site pattern of results in patients with PTSD who completed the dot-
probe task as a measure of attentional bias. Attentional bias on the dot-
probe was measured as the relative latency in response to probes that
appeared in the location of threatening versus non-threatening images.
The results showed that individuals low in attentional control and high
in PTSD symptoms showed an attentional bias for threatening in-
formation, whereas those with medium-high attentional control did
not.
A meta-analysis of emotional Stroop (including trauma-related or
general negative threat stimuli) as a measure of attentional bias toward
threat in PTSD showed that individuals with PTSD demonstrated im-
paired performance in response to trauma-related stimuli compared to
both trauma exposed controls without PTSD and individuals who never
experienced a trauma (Cisler and Koster, 2010; for more recent evi-
dence including the neural substrates of the emotional Stroop effect in
PTSD, see Herzog et al., 2017). Support for an attentional control deficit
in PTSD stems from two findings within this meta-analysis. First, threat
words only impaired Stroop performance in studies with unmasked but
not with masked stimuli, with the former requiring a certain degree of
elaboration and effortful processing and thus attentional control.
Second, effects were stronger in studies with blocked designs, where
slow inter-trial effects that depend on attentional control can emerge.
The causal influence of attentional control on the development and
maintenance of PTSD symptoms, however, remains poorly understood.
A recent study suggested that rather than poor pre-trauma attentional
control constituting a risk factor for the development of PTSD, trauma
exposure may lead to dysregulated attentional processing (Schäfer
et al., 2018). The same group, though, found that pre- and post-de-
ployment attentional bias, as an index of deficits in attentional control,
was associated with symptoms of PTSD in soldiers (Schäfer et al.,
2016). Together, these findings provide preliminary support for a role
of attentional control in PTSD through its impact on attentional biases,
but the temporal and directional nature of this association warrants
further investigation.
Turning to the link between attentional control and emotion reg-
ulation, any attentional control effects in PTSD are likely to operate on
the different stages of the emotion regulation process (Gross, 2015; see
section 5.1). Early stage effects arguably operate when attention is
deployed toward non-threatening information and away from threat
eliciting cues (Shvil et al., 2013). This avoidance of trauma-related
information may come at the cost of increased re-experiencing and
related distress (Bomyea and Lang, 2016; Măirean and Ceobanu, 2017).
Good emotion regulation capacity and the attentional control it relies
on, in turn, are required later in the emotion regulation process to ef-
fortfully regulate unwanted intrusions and their associated distress
(Bomyea and Lang, 2016). For example, Bomyea and Lang showed that
in sexual trauma survivors with low executive control (measured by a
complex span task argued to rely on attentional control; Kane et al.,
2001) avoidant thought regulation strategies were associated with
persistent intrusions, whereas they were not in trauma survivors high
on control capacity. Problematically, the general reduction in executive
control capacity (Aupperle et al., 2012), and attentional control in
particular (Flaks et al., 2014), observed in PTSD appears to hinder the
habitual implementation of adaptive emotion regulation strategies,
such as cognitive reappraisal (Karatzias et al., 2018; Shepherd and
Wild, 2014). However, when individuals were experimentally in-
structed to use cognitive reappraisal to regulate their emotions in re-
sponse to negative stimuli, refugees with high levels of post-traumatic
stress symptoms experienced fewer intrusions in the following two days
than those who had been instructed to suppress their affective re-
sponses. Similarly, studies comparing groups with and without PTSD on
behavioral measures of emotion regulation capacity in response to
images presented in the laboratory have shown no group differences in
the ability to down-regulate affective responses (Fitzgerald et al., 2017;
Woodward et al., 2015). Together, these studies suggest that PTSD may
not be associated with deficient emotion regulatory capacity per se, but
in combination with attentional control deficits, habitual selection of
adaptive strategies in daily life becomes impaired.
Interventions targeting these deficits in attentional control capacity
have shown promising preliminary results both as stand-alone inter-
ventions (Badura-Brack et al., 2015; Schweizer et al., 2017) and as
adjuncts to existing interventions for PTSD (Kuckertz et al., 2014). In
support of a mechanistic association between emotion regulation and
control capacity, Schweizer et al. (2017) showed that training atten-
tional control over emotional information in adolescents with PTSD
improved not only symptoms of PTSD but also self-reported use of
positive emotion regulation strategies. Moreover, training adaptive
strategies such as reappraisal may also be effective, as suggested by a
study using a trauma analogue film paradigm (Woud et al., 2012). In
sum, the evidence reviewed here supports an interacting role of at-
tentional control and emotion regulation capacity in the onset and
maintenance of post-traumatic stress symptoms. Importantly, these
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effects may be harnessed to develop easy to disseminate, computerized
training interventions to reduce suffering in those who experience
symptoms of post-traumatic stress in the aftermath of trauma exposure.
4.5.2. Emotional memory and emotional distraction in PTSD
Sometimes the opposing effects of emotion on cognition (enhanced
emotional memory vs. increased emotional distraction) co-occur. For
example, hearing a gunshot may capture our attention and distract us
from ongoing activities. In turn, such increased distraction by task-ir-
relevant emotional stimuli may lead to better memory for the dis-
tracting information itself and, if that incident had a powerful effect on
us, such memories can become intruding later on. The co-occurrence of
enhancing and impairing effects of emotion is probably most evident in
affective disorders, where both of these opposing effects are ex-
acerbated. For instance, uncontrolled recollection of and rumination on
distressing memories observed in PTSD may also lead to impaired
cognition due to enhanced emotional distraction. This section discusses
evidence regarding alterations of the neural mechanisms associated
with emotional memory and emotional distraction in PTSD, with a
focus on regions involved in episodic and working memory (i.e., MTL
and dlPFC, respectively). Links between emotional memory and emo-
tional distraction in PTSD are also discussed.
Regarding emotional memory, neurobiological models of PTSD
(Layton and Krikorian, 2002) propose that the development and
maintenance of the disorder is linked to altered activity in the MTL
during encoding of traumatic memories. Hence, intrusive recollection
of traumatic memories observed in PTSD may be linked to dysfunction
of the basic MTL mechanism identified in healthy participants as being
responsible for the memory-enhancing effect of emotion (Dolcos et al.,
2004b). Specifically, processing of cues related to traumatic events may
trigger recollection of traumatic memories, which due to dysfunctional
interactions between AMY and the MTL memory system may engage a
self-sustaining functional loop in which emotion processing in AMY
may enhance recollection by increasing activity in HC. This, in turn,
may intensify AMY activity as a result of re-experiencing the emotions
associated with the recollected memories (Dolcos et al., 2005). On the
other hand, there is also evidence suggesting a disconnect between the
effects observed in AMY and their link to emotional or cognitive aspects
of processing in PTSD patients. Specifically, whereas greater AMY ac-
tivation is identified in studies of symptom provocation (Rauch et al.,
2000; Shin et al., 2004), such an effect is not observed in studies of
cognitive processing (Admon et al., 2018; Morey et al., 2008).
An important observation that has emerged in the PTSD literature
may reconcile this apparent discrepancy. Specifically, there is evidence
that memories for negative events in PTSD patients may be non-spe-
cific, gist-based, rather than detailed, context-based (Harvey et al.,
1998; McNally et al., 1994). Gist refers to familiarity-based retrieval of
memories for the general meaning of a situation or event, rather than
recollection of specific contextual details (Tulving, 1985). Given that
gist-based memories are often inaccurate (Roediger and McDermott,
1995; Wright and Loftus, 1998) and susceptible to enhanced rate of
false alarms that may diminish or cancel an actual enhancing impact of
emotion on memory (Dolcos et al., 2005), it may be the case that the
basic AMY-MTL mechanisms typically responsible for the memory-en-
hancing effect of emotion are in fact attenuated in PTSD. Hence, this
could explain the non-specific, gist-based, memories observed in these
patients. This idea is supported by recent findings from an fMRI study
using the subsequent memory paradigm with emotional stimuli in PTSD
patients (Hayes et al., 2011), which showed reduced memory-related
activity in the AMY-MTL system during memory encoding, and higher
false alarm rates during retrieval, compared to a trauma exposed con-
trol (TEC) participants. Moreover, the PTSD patients also lacked the
anterior-posterior dissociation along the longitudinal axis of the MTL,
with respect to its involvement during successful encoding of emotional
memories, which was initially identified in healthy participants (Dolcos
et al., 2004b), but such dissociation was preserved in the TEC group
(Hayes et al., 2011). Taken together, these findings suggest a dis-
organization of the MTL mechanisms involved in the memory-enhan-
cing effect of emotion in PTSD, which leads to inefficient encoding of
information for trauma-related stimuli and subsequent non-specific
gist-based retrieval (Dolcos, 2013).
Regarding emotional distraction, studies investigating the neural
correlates of the impairing effect of task-irrelevant emotional distrac-
tion on cognitive performance identified distinct patterns of responses
in emotion and cognitive control brain regions (i.e., increased activity
in AMY and reduced activity in dlPFC, respectively), which are specific
to emotional distraction (Iordan et al., 2013b). On the one hand, based
on this evidence, increased emotional reactivity linked to changes in
the AMY function in PTSD may lead to increased specific disruption of
dlPFC activity by emotional distraction. On the other hand, there is
evidence for a non-specific heightened sensitivity to both threatening
and non-threatening stimuli in PTSD (Grillon and Morgan, 1999),
which may explain increased distractibility to trauma related and un-
related stimuli alike.
The fact that information unrelated to the trauma may also be
highly distracting in PTSD patients is consistent with the clinically
observed symptom of hypervigilance in these patients, and with the
evidence for non-specific encoding of trauma-related material discussed
above (Hayes et al., 2011). Specifically, it is reasonable to expect that
seemingly neutral stimuli that may remind of trauma could act as cues
for non-specific retrieval of trauma-related information, which in turn
may be as distracting as the trauma-related stimuli themselves. Evi-
dence from a recent study of WM with trauma-related and non-related
distraction is consistent with this idea (Morey et al., 2009). Using an
adaptation of our WM task with emotional distraction (Dolcos and
McCarthy, 2006), the study by Morey and colleagues investigated how
trauma-related task-irrelevant emotional information modulates WM
networks in PTSD. Similar to the study on memory encoding discussed
above, recent post-9/11 war veterans were divided into a PTSD group
and a TEC group. fMRI results showed that the PTSD group had greater
trauma-specific activation than the control group in main emotion
processing brain regions, including the AMY and vlPFC, as well as in
brain regions susceptible to emotion modulation (e.g., FG). However,
the PTSD group also showed greater non-specific disruption of activity
to both combat-related and neutral task-irrelevant distracters in brain
regions involved in the maintenance on goal-relevant information, in-
cluding the dlPFC. This suggests a more generalized dlPFC disruption in
the PTSD than in the control group, which showed only disruption
specific to the trauma-related distraction. The non-specific dlPFC re-
sponse to combat vs. non-combat distracters in PTSD is consistent with
the hypervigilance hypothesis that may explain enhanced response to
neutral stimuli. This neural-level finding was complemented by the
behavioral results, which showed lower overall WM performance for
task-irrelevant distracters scenes in the PTSD group, in the absence of a
differential impact between combat-related and neutral distracters.
4.5.3. Linking emotional memory and emotional distraction in PTSD
Overall, the evidence from the two separate lines of investigations
discussed above, regarding the neural changes in PTSD linked to dys-
functions in the recollection of traumatic events and the response to
emotional distraction, converge toward the idea that non-specific re-
sponses to emotional and neutral distraction may reflect retrieval dis-
tortions linked to inefficient initial encoding of trauma-related in-
formation. Namely, it is possible that the non-specific disruption of the
dlPFC activity by trauma-related and neutral distraction is linked to the
retrieval of the traumatic memories triggered by non-specific cues,
which may also contribute to the perpetuation of the state of hyper-
arousal observed in these patients. Moreover, it is also possible that the
source of these effects is linked to elevated arousal during the initial
exposure to traumatic events. Consistent with this idea, in addition to
showing non-specific activity to subsequently remembered items in
AMY and the MTL memory system in PTSD, the study by Hayes and
F. Dolcos, et al. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 108 (2020) 559–601
580
colleagues discussed above (Hayes et al., 2011) also identified a nega-
tive co-variation of memory-related HC activity for trauma-related
items with scores of hyperarousal symptoms, as measured with the
Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale. In other words, participants who
had greater hyperarousal scores also had reduced memory-related ac-
tivity during the encoding of trauma-related pictures. This finding is
consistent with evidence for an inverted U-shaped function in the HC as
a function of stress (Nadel and Jacobs, 1998) and provides a possible
explanation for the non-specific effects observed in the tasks assessing
emotional memory for trauma-related cues and their undifferentiated
impact on goal-relevant processing when presented as task-irrelevant
distraction. Consistent with the role of the initial arousal in these ef-
fects, PTSD patients also showed relatively greater activity for forgotten
items, which may be linked to AMY hyperactivity leading to later for-
getting of those items (Hayes et al., 2011).
In summary, available evidence from investigations of PTSD pa-
tients points to general and specific emotional and cognitive dis-
turbances that are linked to alterations in the neural circuitry under-
lying emotion-cognition interactions, and specifically linked to
attention. This evidence suggests that reduction of AMY and HC signals
for trauma-related cues may underlie non-specific encoding of gist-
based representations instead of specific and detailed contextual details
of the trauma-related memories. This, in turn, may be linked to
symptoms of hypervigilance and non-specific responses to trauma-re-
lated distraction, which contribute to the maintenance of a hyperar-
ousal state. This evidence also highlights the importance of in-
vestigating both the enhancing and the impairing effects of emotion to
understand the changes associated with affective disorders, where both
effects are intensified (Dolcos, 2013). Collectively, these findings point
to the importance of investigating both of these opposing effects of
emotion within the same clinical group, to complement similar ap-
proaches in healthy participants concomitantly investigating the en-
hancing and impairing effects of emotion on cognitive processes
(Dolcos et al., 2013; Shafer and Dolcos, 2012).
5. Training and interventions to optimize emotion-attention
interactions
Neuroplasticity, the idea that the brain is plastic, is not entirely new,
but one that recent research is capitalising on for its potential to posi-
tively influence mental health and well-being (Kays et al., 2012). When
we learn new information, consolidate old information into new, and
plan for the future, our brain is constantly generating new neural
connections, and regenerating old neural connections as it sees re-
levant. Neuroplasticity is an exercise that the brain does naturally, to
adapt to new situations, adjust, and change according to situational
demands. It is the fuel for resilience, the art of adapting smartly, to
survive (Kays et al., 2012). The emotional and cognitive brain systems
rely on neuroplasticity to communicate with each other flexibly to at-
tain behavioral outcomes (Pessoa, 2017). Emotional systems are in-
strumental for our survival, from detecting signs of danger to experi-
encing basic emotions such as sadness, joy, pain, and fear, to more
elaborate emotions such as gratitude, grief, and grit. Cognitive systems,
on the other hand, are programmed to manage and regulate our emo-
tions. They fuel the brain to regulate emotions, harmonise, and gen-
erate appropriate responses, and help us make decisions (Pessoa, 2013).
Hence, effective communication between emotional and cognitive brain
systems is incredibly important for sustaining cognitive and emotional
health, and for succeeding in both every day and more challenging
tasks. Provided the intricate relation between cognition and emotion, it
has been argued that a strict distinction between these two systems is
problematic (Pessoa, 2017).
Because of the intertwined nature of affective and cognitive pro-
cesses, it is reasonable to imagine that changing aspects in one domain
may affect information processing in the other. For instance, reducing
one’s sensitivity to emotional stimuli will also influence the way they
impact cognitive processes, such as attention, perception, and memory.
On the other hand, similar effects can be obtained by improving one’s
ability to exert top down control on the way emotional stimuli are
processed. Hence, this section emphasizes the dual relations between
emotion and attention, as it is not only the case that emotions influence
attention but cognitive training of attention also influences emotion
processing. Following an introduction of evidence linking attentional
control, working memory, and emotion regulation, this section dis-
cusses emerging evidence about how training and interventions can
optimize emotion-attention interactions.
5.1. Executive/attentional control and emotion regulation
Executive functioning refers to a set of processes, such as WM and
selective attention, necessary for monitoring behaviors that facilitate
the attainment of goals. Emotion regulation is defined as the automatic
and volitional processes that determine an individual’s affective ex-
perience (Gross, 2002). These processes vary in the extent to which they
depend on executive control operations: inhibition, WM updating, and
set-shifting (Friedman and Miyake, 2017). In their seminal paper on the
cognitive control of emotion, Ochsner and Gross (2005) defined control
as ranging from attentional control to cognitive change, where atten-
tional control refers to attention selection toward or away from affec-
tive information depending on its motivational properties (Pourtois
et al., 2013), and cognitive change encompasses the application of
higher cognitive abilities including WM and long-term memory to
emotion regulatory processes. More recently, Braunstein et al. (2017)
have expanded on this to operationalize emotion regulation strategies
along a second dimension. In addition to considering emotion reg-
ulatory processes’ demands on executive control ranging from primarily
automatic to controlled processes, this extended framework further
considers the nature of the emotion regulatory goals: explicit versus
implicit. Here, we focus on emotion regulation processes that rely on
executive control, where explicit regulation processes include regula-
tion strategies such as reappraisal (Buhle et al., 2014) and cognitive
distraction (Moyal et al., 2014), whereas implicit regulatory processes
refer to automatic affective control observed on affective versions of the
Stroop and Go/No go tasks (Schmeichel and Tang, 2015; see also Wager
and Atlas, 2015); see also Braunstein et al. (2017), for evidence about
automatic regulation processes that require little cognitive control re-
sources.
5.1.1. Explicit emotion regulation and working memory
Several meta-analytic reviews of explicit emotion regulation stra-
tegies provide robust evidence for brain networks involved in attention
control (Buschman and Kastner, 2015) and WM (Nee et al., 2013), in
particular the lateral PFC, to be recruited for successful emotion reg-
ulation (Buhle et al., 2014; Ochsner et al., 2012). The majority of the
literature is focused on reappraisal or non-specific down-regulation. In
the latter participants are required to down-regulate their emotions, but
they may be engaging in any number of emotion regulatory strategies
(e.g., attentional deployment, distraction, reappraisal) that will vary in
terms of their demands on control resources. With the exception of
Buhle et al. (2014), who focused exclusively on reappraisal, this hinders
conclusions with regard to specific emotion regulation strategies. In-
terestingly, despite this relatively extensive neuroscientific literature,
there is less experimental work directly probing the association be-
tween executive control capacity and emotion regulation. Preliminary
evidence from the WM literature shows that individuals with high WM
capacity appear better at both voluntary and spontaneous emotion
regulation (McRae et al., 2012; Schmeichel and Demaree, 2010), al-
though Gyurak et al. (2012) failed to show this association in healthy
individuals and individuals suffering from neurodegenerative disorders.
Critical prospective studies suggest that these individual differences in
WM capacity interact with stressful exposure to predict mental health
functioning (Pe et al., 2016; Quinn and Joormann, 2015). Arguably the
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mechanism through which WM capacity influences mental health out-
comes is through emotion regulation. That is, lower WM capacity
during stress leaves less resources for the deployment of adaptive reg-
ulation strategies.
Outside the laboratory, recent advances have provided further
support for the role of WM in emotion regulation. For example, in an
experience sampling study (N=95), Pe and colleagues (Pe et al.,
2013b) showed that affective WM updating ability predicted in-
dividuals’ ability to down-regulate high-arousal negative affective
states (e.g., experiencing anger), but not low-arousal negative affective
states (e.g., dysphoria). Finally, preliminary evidence suggests that
emotion regulation may be improved by WM training. That is, training
WM for emotional material improved both implicit (Schweizer et al.,
2011) and explicit emotion regulation (Schweizer et al., 2013). The
gains in reappraisal capacity following affective WM compared to pla-
cebo training were mediated by changes in lateral PFC activation
during the affective WM task as well as behavioral improvement in
affective WM (Schweizer et al., 2013). Together these findings highlight
the sparsity of empirical evidence investigating the association between
explicit emotion regulation and executive control in general and WM in
particular. The available evidence also suggests that good WM capacity
is critical to successful emotion regulation.
5.1.2. Implicit emotion regulation and attentional control
Braunstein et al. (2017) dissociated between two types of implicit
emotion regulation. The first operates in the context of another task
where affective experiences are regulated to successfully complete an-
other task. That is, the emotion regulatory goal here is incidental to the
overarching task goal. The second type of implicit emotion regulation
refers to emotion regulatory efforts triggered by implicitly activated (cf.
primed goal states) regulation goals. For a review of the latter, see
Bargh and Williams (2007), as it is beyond the scope of this review. The
first type of implicit emotion regulation is critical for everyday func-
tioning by inhibiting attention toward task-irrelevant affective in-
formation (e.g., phone alerts) when performing another task. In the
laboratory, affective attentional control is typically measured with
emotional Stroop (Phaf and Kan, 2007) and affective Go/No-Go (Schulz
et al., 2007) tasks (see section 3.2 for affective working memory tasks).
These tasks are again associated with increased recruitment of the
lateral PFC as well the mPFC and dorsal ACC (Braunstein et al., 2017;
Etkin et al., 2011). Individual differences in affective attentional control
are associated with a range of functional outcomes related to mental
health. Poor affective attentional control as measured by greater in-
terference from negative material on the affective Stroop task is related
to biased attention toward negative information in anxious individuals
and those suffering from anxiety disorders (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Poor
inhibition of prepotent affective responses as measured by the emo-
tional Go/No-Go task has also been observed in both bi- and unipolar
mood disorders (Phillips et al., 2008). Importantly, evidence from the
developmental literature shows that these deficits in attentional control
(cf., effortful control; Eisenberg et al., 2014) are prospectively asso-
ciated with mental health, including externalizing and internalizing
symptoms (e.g., Han et al., 2016).
In sum, both explicit and implicit emotion regulation appear to vary
as a function of individual differences in executive control capacity. The
neural substrates underlying successful emotion regulation include the
lateral PFC and extend to the mPFC and dorsal ACC for implicit emotion
regulation.
5.2. Introduction to executive control training
Deficits in executive control and cognitive biases harm the well-
being of those affected, impacting the way they pay attention to, in-
terpret, and remember information, and play a key role (either causal or
contributory) in the onset, maintenance, and possibly the recurrence
of/recovery from these conditions (Power and Dalgleish, 2015).
However, accumulating evidence suggests that attentional biases and
executive functions are plastic and can be altered by early and adult life
experiences or interventions (Bar-Haim and Pine, 2013; MacLeod and
Clarke, 2015). For example, the type of care-giving and the type of
parental communication were found to be associated with children's
performance on inhibition, WM, and cognitive flexibility tasks (Spruijt
et al., 2018). Moreover, there is evidence that cognitive-behavioral and
pharmacological treatments for anxiety also tend to reduce attentional
biases to threat-related cues (Reinecke et al., 2013; Van Bockstaele
et al., 2014). In light of the above, studies on adult interventions, such
as cognitive training of adaptive allocation of attention or improvement
of inhibitory functions, aim to reduce attentional biases. In non-clinical
samples, attention modification has been shown to reduce distress,
behavioral signs of anxiety, and intrusive thoughts elicited during
subsequent exposure to cognitive stressors, public speaking challenges,
and worry inductions in adults and children (Bar-Haim et al., 2011;
MacLeod and Mathews, 2012).
There is also evidence for neural plasticity following training. For
example, using a demanding task requiring inhibition of distracters,
Cohen et al. (2016) trained healthy participants to exert cognitive
control. One week of training resulted in reduced activation in the AMY
when presented with threatening distracting pictures, which was linked
to a reduction in emotional interference to task performance; further-
more, the training also resulted in enhanced PFC-AMY connectivity.
Similarly, Beauchamp et al. (2016) employed an inhibitory control
training task using a stop signal and showed that the training group
exhibited reduced activity in prefrontal and supramarginal regions.
Although, unlike the training by Cohen et al. (2016), this training did
not result in behavioral changes, the neural changes were found in
regions previously associated with motivation, expectancy, and execu-
tive attention, suggesting that the training was effective. In adult clin-
ical samples, medium-to-small treatment effects have been observed
compared to placebo training (MacLeod and Clarke, 2015; Price et al.,
2016). The most promising and consistent effects have emerged in
studies where the intervention showed evidence of "target engage-
ment", that is, a demonstrable reduction in attentional biases to threat-
related cues (MacLeod and Grafton, 2016; Price et al., 2016). Finally,
important limitations of existing protocols for attentional bias mod-
ification have also been highlighted (see discussion in Okon-Singer,
2018). For example, it was noted that training may be efficient only for
a certain age and when conducted in laboratory settings (Price et al.,
2016; see also Koster et al., 2017 who noted that training efficiency
depends on the fit between the type of training and diagnosis).
5.3. Attentional control and working memory training in anxiety and
depression
Emerging research shows that in emotional disorders such as an-
xiety and depression, the balance between emotional and cognitive
brain systems is disrupted and biased towards processing of negative
emotional information (threat, sadness, etc.). Indeed, a major char-
acteristic of anxious and depressed people is to process threatening
information to large extents, ruminate on past negative events, and
worry excessively about the uncertainty of the future (see Mogg and
Bradley, 2018, for a review). Our brain systems are capacity limited,
and so when we get stuck on negative (and task irrelevant) information,
we have fewer resources to invest in completing the demands of the
tasks at hand, and find it difficult to shift attention and process in-
formation efficiently (Derakshan and Eysenck, 2009). This gives rise to
patterns of cognitive inflexibility (see Stange et al., 2017, for a review).
When executive functions of WM become inefficient and rigid, we are
more likely to distract from attending to the necessities of the task at
hand, experience interference, and so find it difficult to achieve our
goals efficiently (Berggren and Derakshan, 2013a).
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5.3.1. Attentional control interventions in anxiety
According to the ACT of anxiety (Berggren and Derakshan, 2013a;
Eysenck et al., 2007), as a result of impairments in processing efficiency
and attentional control, the brain engages in recruiting extra cognitive
resources for achieving behavioral outcomes; usually, referred to as
compensatory effort, a prediction that has received much support to
date (Ansari and Derakshan, 2011). ACT proposed a key central role for
attentional control as a determinant of emotional vulnerability and
resilience in anxiety, which may also hold for depression (De Raedt and
Koster, 2010). The idea was that poor levels of attentional control (or
cognitive inflexibility) can act as a risk marker for the onset, main-
tenance, and the recurrence of anxiety. Similarly, in depression atten-
tional control has been argued to play a causal role in the development,
maintenance, and recurrence of depressive states, with accumulating
evidence supporting this (see Koster et al., 2017, for a review).
The thinking that attentional control can have a causal role to play
in vulnerability to emotional disorders has received substantial support
in a number of clinical (Motter et al., 2016) and educational (Holmes
and Gathercole, 2014) domains. There are huge implications not only
for treatment but also for preventing these disorders. Interventions can
be built to exercise neuroplasticity in executive functions of WM tar-
geting neural circuits involved in boosting attentional control. The idea
is that, with better levels of attentional control, individuals can manage
and regulate emotional experiences more effectively, feel empowered,
improve performance levels, and boost immunity against vicious cycles
of negative thinking, worrying, and helplessness, which are main fea-
tures of anxiety and depressive states. Boosting attentional control and
cognitive flexibility through neuroplasticity induced change holds
much promise in psychopathology, where the exercise of key neuro-
cognitive functions can be used to treat as well as protect against es-
calating levels of emotional vulnerability (Siegle et al., 2007a). Whilst
still in their infancy, cognitive training interventions have shown pro-
mise in promoting neuroplasticity-induced change in main executive
functions of WM towards improving attentional control. The exploita-
tion of such techniques to improve our understanding of the causal role
of attentional control in psychopathology has received substantial at-
tention. At the same time, this also allows to examine the potential of
such interventions to reduce emotional vulnerability levels in anxiety
and depression. Findings dating back to work by Siegle and colleagues
(Siegle et al., 2007b) show that it is possible to reduce depressive re-
lated symptomatology using cognitive training, with reductions in ru-
minative thinking being a key mediating mechanism (see also
Hoorelbeke and Koster, 2017; Siegle et al., 2014).
A consistent finding across numerous studies shows that levels of
engagement with the training, and improvement on the training task,
correlates with reductions in emotional vulnerability (e.g., Grol et al.,
2018; Hotton et al., 2018). Consequently, greater engagement levels
with training are shown to predict lower levels of emotional vulner-
ability post vs. pre-intervention, at least in subclinical levels of emo-
tional vulnerability to psychopathology. In an applied extension of this
paradigm to target anxiety related impairments in practices such as
tennis performance, where the exercise of attentional control is key to
successful performance, the adaptive dual n-back training has improved
tennis performance under situations of high pressure (anxiety), through
its effects on increasing WM capacity (Ducrocq et al., 2017). In a novel
application of the adaptive dual n-back training intervention to tar-
geting emotional symptomatology in survivors of breast cancer, it was
found that, compared to controls, participants who underwent the
adaptive training protocol for two weeks showed marked reductions in
anxiety and distress as well as rumination up to 18 months post inter-
vention (Swainston and Derakshan, 2018). This was accompanied with
self-reports of how much participants enjoyed the training and how it
made them feel empowered and able. The fact that training helped
reduce emotional vulnerability was important, because emotional vul-
nerability to anxiety and depression in this population is high, but the
key finding was the sustainability of these reductions over time,
attesting to the consolidating effect of neuroplasticity induced changed
over prefrontal regions.
The application of cognitive training techniques in clinical settings
has been less investigated and should be a direction for future research
to exploit. There is promising evidence that increasing processing effi-
ciency via cognitive training targeting patterns of affective processing
can help improve cognitive appraisal (Cohen and Mor, 2018) and
emotion regulation (Hoorelbeke et al., 2016; Ritchey et al., 2011a;
Schweizer et al., 2013), with significant implications for a number of
populations at risk of anxiety and depressive disorders. In a similar
fashion, if cognitive training has the potential to increase processing
efficiency then it can aid in the efficacy of dominant therapeutic in-
terventions, such as cognitive behavioral therapy and mindfulness,
which rely on attentional control. A recent study found that, when the
adaptive dual n-back training was combined with mindfulness medi-
tation, it had the greatest longitudinal effects on reductions in trait
worrying in a sample of high worriers, compared to when mindfulness
was administered alone (Course-Choi et al., 2017). This suggests that
the adaptive dual n-back through its emphasis on cognitive plasticity
aided in the efficacy of mindfulness meditation which uses prefrontal
functions of control.
5.3.2. Attentional control interventions in depression
The past decade, a number of studies have investigated different
types of attention and executive training programs to remediate de-
pressive symptoms and/or vulnerability to depression. Although this
research area is still under full development, there are several inter-
esting strands of research that we briefly discuss below. Based on the
research that has indicated that depression is characterized by problems
in disengaging attention from negative information, several studies
have investigated whether retraining this attentional bias has positive
effects on depressive symptoms. Based on the seminal studies on the
influence of experimental manipulation of attentional bias on emo-
tional reactivity (MacLeod et al., 2002), researchers have examined
whether ABM is capable to influence emotion regulation and depressive
symptoms, specifically. In ABM research, the standard dot probe task
that is typically used to examine attentional bias is changed into a
training task that is intended to manipulate attentional bias. Within this
task, a pair of an emotional and a non-emotional stimulus are briefly
presented on a screen, followed by a task-relevant probe that replaces
one of these two stimuli. To manipulate attention towards or away from
an emotional stimulus, this probe can be presented always at the lo-
cation of the emotional or the non-emotional stimulus, encouraging
attention to be deployed to emotional information or away from emo-
tional information, respectively.
Initial studies using ABM training based on the dot probe task were
suggestive of potential benefits of ABM in reducing depressive symp-
toms in subclinical depression (Wells and Beevers, 2010) and depres-
sion vulnerability in remitted depressed individuals (Browning et al.,
2012). However, these effects were typically quite small and other
studies failed to observe any effects of ABM on clinically depressed
individuals (Baert et al., 2010). This lack of robust effects could be due
to several reasons. For instance, it could be that visual attention is not
of key relevance in depression, some of the trained stimulus material
may not be as unambiguous as in anxiety (words like “happy” can be
interpreted in different ways), or the dot probe is not very effective as
an attention training procedure in general (see Koster and Bernstein,
2015). In recent years, authors have started to use eye-tracking meth-
odology to retrain attentional bias in depression. For instance, Sanchez
et al. (2016) monitored attention to positive and negative words during
the unscrambling of ambiguous scrambled sentences (“life is my party a
mess”). Here, attentional bias is first assessed by examining attention
deployed to positive and negative words during unscrambling into
grammatically correct sentences. Subsequently, participants are asked
to always form positive sentences by deploying attention to the positive
words. Individuals are assisted through online feedback about attention
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deployment. This training has been shown to increase emotion reg-
ulation (positive appraisal). Other studies using similar strategies found
that attentional bias can be modified in subclinically depressed in-
dividuals (Krejtz et al., 2018). Despite such encouraging findings, this
field is in need of larger strictly controlled clinical trials.
In a largely independent line of research, it has been examined
whether remediating more general cognitive control functions has
beneficial effects on depressive symptoms. In this context, it is im-
portant that many researchers initially thought that cognitive impair-
ments in depression are a byproduct of negative mood, not an im-
portant factor. However, views have changed markedly where
cognitive/executive impairments can hamper daily activities and
emotion regulation, and can contribute substantially to depression
(Millan et al., 2012). Siegle and colleagues proposed that cognitive
control training might be an important way to remediate some of the
neurocognitive problems in depression, and they provided pilot data
using an adaptive version of the Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task. In
this task, participants are presented with a continuous stream of digits
(several seconds apart) and are asked to add the last two heard digits.
Upon successive correct responses the task goes faster. The task goes
slower when consecutive errors are made. Several studies have applied
this training in individuals at risk for depression (for instance remitted
depressed individuals; Hoorelbeke and Koster, 2017), as well as in
clinically depressed individuals (Siegle et al., 2014). Meta-analytic
evidence (Motter et al., 2016) as well as a recent systematic review
(Koster et al., 2017) indicate that this type of training can improve
depressive symptoms, if sufficient training sessions are administered in
individuals with pre-existing vulnerability to depression.
In recent years, a number of interesting developments have emerged
in this area. First, authors have developed training procedures that
include emotional information which could remediate valence-specific
impairments in cognitive control (e.g., Daches et al., 2015). Second,
initial work has started to elucidate the neural correlates of cognitive
control training (Cohen et al., 2016). Finally, based on this neuroima-
ging work, researchers are increasingly studying the effects of com-
bined interventions on depression, where the combination of cognitive
control training and neurostimulation techniques (repetitive TMS) is
considered promising (De Raedt, 2015). In an intervention that used the
adaptive dual n-back training to target cognitive deficits in dysphoria
(subclinical depression), neurocognitive mechanisms underlying WM
capacity and filtering efficiency performance showed improvement
after training (Owens et al., 2013). The adaptive dual n-back training
intervention which was originally found to improve fluid intelligence,
increased WM capacity and filtering efficiency of irrelevant information
in dysphoria. This intervention is known for its challenging exercise of
prefrontal functions, in a systematic and adaptive manner, with the
active control participants engaging in a substantially less demanding
non-adaptive version of the training. In a similar fashion, this training
intervention was shown to be effective in enhancing resting state at-
tentional control, as measured through electrophysiological measures,
as well as inhibitory control, as measured by a flanker task, in high trait
anxious individuals who trained on this task for 15 days over three
weeks (Sari et al., 2016).
Despite the proven promise of the effectiveness of cognitive training
techniques in influencing emotional vulnerability through enhancing
attentional control, the field is still in its infancy and needs to grow to
accommodate more precise and tailored training regimens for max-
imum benefit. Understanding the trajectory of neurocognitive change
post intervention is key, because it can help build interventions that can
produce more sustainable effects over time and enable change at a more
fundamental level. Adopting a performance-based approach for ex-
amining neurocognitive improvements over time, as a result of training,
and its potential impact on every day memory and cognitive func-
tioning should be examined more thoroughly. Overall, targeting pre-
frontal functions of control and flexibility shows promise to improve
every day well-being towards resilience. The flexibility to adjust and to
accommodate change in an optimum fashion according to situational
demands requires effective practice and consolidation of neuroplasti-
city induced change. Whilst these theoretical ideas are robust, the
methods are still in development. A multi-dimensional understanding of
pathways of transfer-related change in explaining training effects is
needed to optimize the efficacy of interventions and their external va-
lidity in other performance-related domains.
5.4. Focused attention training to optimize emotion processing and enhance
well-being
Aside from the emotion control strategies discussed above, research
has begun to elucidate the impact of emotion regulation strategies in-
volving attentional deployment. One such strategy, focused attention
(FA), involves shifts (controlled and deliberate, or instinctive and au-
tomatic) in attention to or away from the emotional aspects of emotion
eliciting stimuli or (memory for) events, depending on the regulatory
goal of the individual at that time (Gross, 2008; Sheppes et al., 2014).
The effectiveness of attentional deployment emotion regulation strate-
gies has been supported by a recent meta-analysis (Webb et al., 2012),
and the underlying neural mechanisms have been also investigated
(Denkova et al., 2013a, 2013b, 2015; Iordan et al., 2019). Attentional
deployment strategies may be more efficient in controlling emotional
responses, due to their faster deployment (Hajcak et al., 2009; Paul
et al., 2013) and reduced cognitive demands (Mauss et al., 2007),
compared other emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal.
Evidence shows that such strategies are deployed earlier in the emotion
generation sequence (Hajcak et al., 2009; Paul et al., 2013), both when
used with external stimuli (pictures) (Sheppes et al., 2014) and with
recollected memories (Denkova et al., 2015). Moreover, FA has been
also shown to be more effective when used during retrieval of AMs to
reduce symptoms of depression (Kanske et al., 2012).
5.4.1. Focused attention and autobiographical recollection
Emotional AMs, such as the birth of a child, winning an award, or
failing an exam, play an important role in the construction of personal
identity, in future planning, and in decision-making. Hence, they are
key factors in personal emotional well-being. In some circumstances,
excessive focus on the emotional aspects of negative personal experi-
ences can have debilitating consequences and lead to psychiatric dis-
orders. To avoid such consequences, it is important to be able to control
our emotional responses by switching our attentional focus away from
the emotional aspects of our memories, and maintain healthy cognitive
and affective functioning. Understanding how people deal with emo-
tional AMs has relevance for understanding both normal healthy
functioning and the dysfunction and negativity bias observed in pa-
tients with affective disorders. Indeed, excessive focus on emotional
aspects of unpleasant memories has been associated with increased
susceptibility to affective disorders, such as depression and PTSD
(Rubin et al., 2008, 2011), which are characterized by impaired emo-
tion regulation (Gotlib and Joormann, 2010; Mayberg, 1997). Recently
the topic of emotion regulation has gained considerable interest, as the
ability to cope adaptively with emotionally challenging situations is
vital for physical and mental health, and understanding its mechanisms
has important implications for understanding and treating affective
disorders (Gross, 2008; Ochsner and Gross, 2005).
Recent evidence highlights the effectiveness of short-term training
of FA with AM retrieval, both in isolation and in the context of a dual
task with AM recollection presented as internal emotional distraction
(Denkova et al., 2013a, 2013b, 2015; Iordan et al., 2019). For example,
Denkova et al. (Denkova et al., 2013a, Denkova et al., 2013b, 2015)
showed that focusing attention on the non-emotional contextual aspects
(such as time, location, other people present) of highly emotional
personal memories, and away from the emotional aspects, was asso-
ciated with lower self-reported emotional responses, increased activity
in the ventromedial PFC (vmPFC), and decreased activity in the AMY.
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Moreover, a mediation analysis suggested a role of the vmPFC in in-
tegrating affective signals from the AMY and mediating their impact on
the subjective re-experiencing of emotion, according to the current
retrieval/attentional focus. While these findings refer to both pleasant
and unpleasant AMs, valence-related differences were also identified in
the PFC and MTL (Denkova et al., 2013a, 2013b). Importantly, the
finding regarding the role of the AMY described above (see also Dolcos
and McCarthy, 2006) challenges evidence from previous emotion reg-
ulation studies (Johnstone et al., 2007; Urry et al., 2006), mainly em-
phasizing top-down influences on AMY activity from the PFC regions
involved in cognitive control, rather than reciprocal AMY-PFC influ-
ences, initiated in the AMY. In addition, FA is also effective in reducing
the impact of recollected unpleasant AMs when triggered as internal
emotional distraction during a WM task (Iordan et al., 2019). Beha-
viorally, focusing away from emotional aspects of AMs was associated
with better WM performance than focusing on the recollected emotions.
Additionally, when participants focused on non-emotional contextual
details of their memories, there were reduced responses in brain regions
associated with the salience network (i.e., AMY, dorsal ACC, anterior
insula), coupled with greater recruitment of executive prefrontal
(dlPFC) and memory-related temporoparietal regions (para-
hippocampal gyrus, angular gyrus), along with increased fronto-par-
ietal connectivity. Additionally, temporal dissociations were identified
between regions involved in self-referential (showing faster responses)
versus context-related processing (showing delayed responses).
It is important to note that such manipulations following short
training in using FA with AM recollection can be linked to emerging
evidence regarding the effect of episodic specificity induction – i.e., brief
training in recollecting episodic details (Madore and Schacter, 2016).
Research on episodic specificity induction has revealed that focusing on
very specific episodic details of recent events can enhance subsequent
performance on a range of cognitive tasks (Madore et al., 2015;
McFarland et al., 2017), and also psychological well-being (Jing et al.,
2016). These findings are also consistent with recent evidence showing
that training to recollect AMs with increased specificity may yield
beneficial effects in depression (Watkins et al., 2009). The findings from
the Denkova et al. (2015) and Iordan et al. (2019) studies extend such
investigations to emotional AMs, by showing that focusing on non-
emotional aspects of AMs can influence the emotional (re)experience of
such memories. In sum, attentional deployment strategies, such as FA,
seem to have beneficial effects on retrieval of emotional personal
memories, because they can enhance the emotional impact of positive
memories and reduce the impact of negative ones. These behavioral
effects are coupled with differential recruitment and connectivity
among PFC (lateral and medial) and MTL (AMY and HC) regions. To-
gether, these findings support the idea that laboratory tasks can also be
expanded into long-term interventions to train behaviors and brain
responses for improved emotion-attention interactions.
5.4.2. Focused attention and long-term mindfulness training
In recent years, there has been growing interest in the use of FA
training and intervention programs to improve emotion-attention in-
teractions and to identify the underlying brain mechanisms associated
with such improvements (Fox et al., 2014; Lomas et al., 2015). La-
boratory tasks involving manipulations and trainings of attention have
been diverse. Some common forms of attention training include the dot-
probe, visual search, and clinical auditory tasks, which involve visual or
auditory manipulations of attention often with the goal of distracting
from negative information and engaging neutral or positive information
(Wadlinger and Isaacowitz, 2011). One form of FA intervention that has
gained particular prominence is mindfulness, which generally refers to
“the awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in
the present moment, and non-judgmentally to the unfolding of ex-
perience moment by moment” (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Additionally, similar
meditation-oriented interventions, and some lab tasks, have also shown
promise (e.g., integrative body-mind training, Tang and Posner, 2009).
Training programs focusing on mindfulness typically target skills aimed
at reducing distressing symptoms, including those associated with
psychological disorders and somatic conditions. Emerging work sug-
gests that focused attention interventions can modulate memory en-
coding and retrieval (Erisman and Roemer, 2010; Roberts-Wolfe et al.,
2012), which has important implications for affective disturbances
where emotional dysregulation and emotional memories may be a
factor contributing to the reduction of overall well-being (e.g., PTSD,
depression). At the time of encoding, for example, a brief mindfulness
intervention has been shown to enhance reported positive affect in
response to a positive film clip and to reduce reported negative affect
following an affectively mixed film clip (Erisman and Roemer, 2010).
Consistent with these findings, another recent study showed that a
group instructed in focused breathing, one strategy for mindfulness
training, maintained positive responses to neutral images before and
after training, while unfocused attention and worry groups responded
more negatively to the neutral images after the instructed session than
before it (Arch and Craske, 2006). At the time of retrieval, mindfulness
practitioners appear to show greater increases in positive word recall
compared to controls (Roberts-Wolfe et al., 2012), or lower proportions
of negative word recall (Alberts and Thewissen, 2011). Mindfulness
interventions also appear to increase AM specificity, and decrease
memory overgeneralization, which are common symptoms of depres-
sion (Heeren et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2007).
At the neural level, mindfulness interventions have been shown to
induce changes in both the structure and function of the brain, in-
cluding structures involved in attention, emotion, and memory. For
example, studies of brain structure have associated mindfulness
training with increased gray matter volume or density in the cingulate
cortex (Hölzel et al., 2011), insula (Murakami et al., 2012), and HC
(Hölzel et al., 2011). Evidence for structural changes in the AMY seems
a bit less clear (Hölzel et al., 2010; Murakami et al., 2012), and is
perhaps influenced by other factors such as sample demographics.
However, in general, available evidence appears consistent with the
idea that mindfulness engages brain regions that are key for body
awareness, memory, and emotion (Fox et al., 2014). Mindfulness and
meditation practice have also been linked to modulation of structural
connectivity between brain regions. For example, meditation practice
has been associated with changes suggesting enhanced connectivity
within and between hemispheres of the brain (Luders et al., 2012; Tang
et al., 2010), which is in line with the idea that mindfulness and
meditation training can improve the underlying connections in the
brain that support attentional self-regulation processes (Luders et al.,
2012). At the functional level, mindfulness training was linked to
changes in the intrinsic functional connectivity between the default
mode and salience networks (Doll et al., 2015), consistent with the idea
that interactions between brain networks support the ability to attend
to current experience without judgment. Moreover, mindfulness
training appears to also influence brain activity when engaged in tasks,
such as paradigms that involve responding/regulating responses to
emotional stimuli. A study by Creswell and colleagues (Creswell et al.,
2007), for instance, showed that when labeling emotions, the AMY was
negatively associated with lateral PFC activation in more mindful in-
dividuals. This evidence is consistent with the idea that mindfulness
training modulates the neural mechanisms involved in emotion pro-
cessing.
Although how FA interventions alter brain structure is still an open
question that is being investigated, a number of possible mechanisms
have been proposed (reviewed in Tang et al., 2015). An account re-
ferred to as “use-dependent plasticity” (for reviews of relevant studies
in humans, see Draganski and May, 2008; May, 2011) suggests that
there is a relation between the structure of the brain and its level of use.
This account may describe a result of Hebbian learning (Hebb, 1949),
and suggests that these structural changes might lead to alteration in
brain structure (Draganski et al., 2006). Consistent with the Hebbian
learning model, it is possible that repeated engagement in FA affects
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brain structure through expansions of existing synapses and dendrites,
or creation of new synapses. It is also possible that engaging in FA in-
duces the formation of new neurons or myelin sheaths that help insulate
the connections between neurons. Another possibility is that FA influ-
ences autonomic and immune activity, which might help preserve or
restore neurons. Alterations in these mechanisms at the level of brain
cells might contribute to overall changes in the volume of brain regions
and the integrity of the connections between them.
In sum, FA manipulations and interventions, such as mindfulness
training, seem to have beneficial effects on encoding and retrieval of
emotional memories, because they can enhance the emotional impact
of positive memories and reduce the impact of negative ones, and im-
prove overall well-being. Regarding the neural correlates, available
evidence points to down-regulation of emotion-sensitive brain regions
(AMY) by the engagement of cognitive and attentional control regions
(frontal and parietal cortices), similar to other emotion regulation
strategies, such as reappraisal (Kanske et al., 2011; McRae et al., 2010).
Further research in this area will continue refining our understanding of
these effective practices and associated neural mechanisms, in order to
promote well-being.
6. Linguistics
With this understanding of the current state of research on emotion-
attention interactions as a basis, our team was asked to review words
used to express feelings related to attention. As described in the
Introduction, within the realm of affective research, confusion arises
over the fact that feelings are components of more complex affective
responses. For example, “fear” as basic emotion consists of a continuum
of automatically activated defense behaviors (Kozlowska et al., 2015)
that co-occur with “feelings of fear.” Consequently, the term feeling is
often used incorrectly as a synonym for emotion and vice versa (LeDoux,
2015; Munezero et al., 2014). But feelings are not emotions per se
(LeDoux, 2015) and are not limited to those that co-occur with specific
basic emotions. Rather, feelings might encompass a wide range of
mental experiences, such as signifying physiological needs (e.g.,
hunger), tissue injury (e.g., pain), optimal function (e.g., well-being),
the dynamics of social interactions (e.g., gratitude) (Damasio and
Carvalho, 2013). Additional challenges relate to the fact that feelings
are not consistently defined, and that definitions for these terms can
evolve over time (Tissari, 2016). Moreover, while some feelings may be
universally experienced across cultures (e.g., hunger, pain, cold, fa-
tigue), others are understood to be culturally constructed (e.g., grati-
tude, optimism) (Boiger and Mesquita, 2012; Joshi and Carter, 2013).
As a result, the Human Affectome Project taskforce agreed that any
attempt to create a linguistic inventory of articulated feelings would
need to first define feelings in a manner that can help us understand the
full range of terms to be considered and then undertaken with an acute
awareness that variations in terminology are going to exist in day-to-
day usage, between languages and across cultures. Hence, a definition
for feelings was developed as part of the project. A small task team
within the larger effort reviewed the literature to create a definition for
feelings that could serve as a starting point. The task team produced a
first draft and shared it with the entire taskforce of nearly 200 re-
searchers, feedback/input was gathered, and then it was refined, re-
distributed and the process iterated several times to achieve broad
consensus within the group. The resulting definition is as follows:
A “feeling” is a fundamental construct in the behavioral and neu-
robiological sciences encompassing a wide range of mental phenomena
and individual experiences, many of which relate to homeostatic as-
pects of survival and life regulation (Buck, 1985; Damasio and
Carvalho, 2013; LeDoux, 2012; Panksepp, 2010; Strigo and Craig,
2016). A broad definition for feeling is an appraisal or mental re-
presentation that emerges from physiological/bodily states (Damasio
and Carvalho, 2013; LeDoux, 2012; Nummenmaa et al., 2014), pro-
cesses inside (e.g., psychological processes) and outside the central
nervous system, and/or environmental circumstances. However, the
full range of feelings is diverse as they can emerge from basic emotions
(Buck, 1985; Damasio and Carvalho, 2013; Panksepp, 2010), levels of
arousal, actions (Bernroider and Panksepp, 2011; Gardiner, 2015),
hedonics (pleasure and pain) (Buck, 1985; Damasio and Carvalho,
2013; LeDoux, 2012; Panksepp, 2010), drives (Alcaro and Panksepp,
2011), and cognitions (including appraisals of self) (Ellemers, 2012;
Frewen et al., 2013; Northoff et al., 2009), motives (Higgins and
Pittman, 2008), social interactions (Damasio and Carvalho, 2013;
Gilam and Hendler, 2016; LeDoux, 2012; Panksepp, 2010), and both
reflective (Holland and Kensinger, 2010) and anticipatory perspectives
(Buck, 1985; Miloyan and Suddendorf, 2015).
The duration of feelings can vary considerably, from those asso-
ciated with brief emotional responses (surprise) to longer-lasting sen-
timents (love). They are often represented in language (Kircanski et al.,
2012), although they can sometimes be difficult to recognize and ver-
balize, and some feelings can be shaped by culture (Immordino-Yang
et al., 2014). Feelings that are adaptive in nature (Izard, 2007; Strigo
and Craig, 2016) serve as a response to help an individual interpret,
detect changes in, and make sense of their circumstances at any given
point in time. This includes homeostatic feelings that influence other
physiological or mental states, emotions, motives, actions, and beha-
viors in support of adaptation and well-being (Damasio and Carvalho,
2013; Strigo and Craig, 2016). However, some feelings can be mala-
daptive and may compete and/or interfere with goal-directed behavior.
Finally, as also mentioned in the Introduction, a “feeling” is not a
synonym of “emotion.” Also, there is standing debate between re-
searchers who posit that discrete emotion categories correspond to
distinct brain regions (Izard, 2010) and those who argue that discrete
emotion categories are constructed of generalized brain networks that
are not specific to those categories (Lindquist et al., 2012). However,
both groups acknowledge that in many instances feelings are discern-
able components of emotional responses, which tend to be more com-
plex.
Using this definition of feelings as a starting point, the linguistics
task team then undertook a formal linguistic analysis and ultimately
proposed nine broad categories of feelings (i.e., Physiological or Bodily
states, Attraction and Repulsion, Attention, Social, Actions and
Prospects, Hedonics, Anger, General Wellbeing, and Other)
(Siddharthan et al., 2018). Feelings related to attention were described
as “Feelings related to focus, attention, or interest (e.g. interested, curious,
etc.), or the lack thereof (e.g. uninterested, apathetic, etc.).” We reviewed
the feelings found in this category of this linguistics analysis, consisting
of just 51 meanings that fell into a handful of categories. Several terms
related to the degree of interest, ranging from uninterested and in-
attentive at one extreme to conscious awareness, attentive, and en-
grossed at the other extreme. Other categories of meanings that we
could discern referred to social attentiveness, and indexing possible
causes of attention, such as curiosity and fascination. Lastly, one set of
meanings referred to attention when it is directed towards inner
thoughts (e.g., meditative, pensive) (see Supplementary Table 1 for de-
tails).
It is interesting to note that the feelings ranging from uninterested
and inattentive at one extreme to conscious awareness, attentive and
engrossed at the other extreme represent a continuum along the valence
and arousal dimensions, from negative valence, low arousal word
meanings that extend to positive valence, high arousal meanings.
However, there are notable exceptions, as some words may be highly
arousing and negatively-valence, such as “obsessed.” At the same time,
some “feeling” words related to attention directed towards inner
thoughts do not appear to be valenced; instead, they primarily re-
present a statement of attentional status, which is notable since most
feelings are assumed to be valenced.
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7. Conclusions and future directions
The present review provided a survey of available and emerging
evidence on emotion-attention interactions and the associated neural
mechanisms, capitalizing on contributions from researchers with di-
verse expertise spanning behavioral, lesion, brain imaging, and inter-
vention approaches. We began by discussing available evidence con-
cerning how emotion-attention interactions influence basic perception
and social cognition (section 2), as well as learning and different types
of memory (working and episodic) (section 3). Then, we turned to our
discussion of the role of individual differences in a variety of domains
that affect emotion-attention interactions (section 4). Finally, we dis-
cussed emerging evidence demonstrating how training and interven-
tions can optimize emotion-attention interactions (section 5). The
themes from these sections are also reflected in the terms identified by
the linguistic search (section 6) that is central to this special issue (see
Supplementary Table 1), including domains related to conscious
awareness, motivational effects of attention, social attention, and
emotion regulation. This comprehensive approach allowed for an in-
tegrative overview of the available evidence regarding the mechanisms
of emotion-attention interactions and highlighted emerging directions
for future investigations. Consistent with the framework described in
the Introduction, we will briefly summarize and discuss the extant
evidence in the context of these core themes.
7.1. Emotion-attention interactions in perception
The available evidence on emotion-attention interactions addresses
many aspects related to perception, spanning from whether processing
of emotional information can occur without conscious awareness to
how emotion-attention interactions are associated with processing of
higher-order social cognition. Although controversy still exists, evi-
dence suggests that processing of emotional information in humans can
occur without awareness, and highlights the AMY as playing a key role,
whereas evidence regarding cortical emotion processing regions (i.e.,
mPFC and vlPFC) points to susceptibility to modulation by attention
when attentional resources are most available (Shafer and Dolcos,
2012). This recent research also highlights the importance of whether
emotional stimuli are task-relevant and enhance cognitive performance,
or are task-irrelevant and impair performance. Much of the research on
emotion-attention interactions has focused on negative emotion, but a
growing corpus of evidence has shown that incentives or positive re-
inforcement (i.e., gaining monetary or other forms of reward for correct
performance) can improve performance on cognitive tasks. Similar to
negative emotional stimuli, presentation of stimuli associated with re-
ward or signaling potential future reward or loss of reward can con-
tribute to distraction, if such reward signals are incongruent with the
current task (Anderson et al., 2013). Neuroimaging and physiological
evidence suggest that reward stimuli recruit attentional resources, and
shape motor selection and action via interactions among the ventral
striatum, dorsal striatum, and prefrontal cortex (Braver, 2016; Pessoa,
2013).
Evidence also highlights emotion-attention interactions in the con-
text of social cognition, both at the level of initial perceptual processes
and attention paid to social stimuli, such as faces, bodies, and voices (de
Gelder, 2006; Grandjean et al., 2005), and at the level of higher-order
social cognitive processes (Freeman and Ambady, 2011), such as im-
pressions, judgements, and decisions. At the level of perception, re-
search has largely examined processing of faces, and more recently
bodies, and the association with electrophysiological (ERP) and he-
modynamic (fMRI) markers. In the ERP domain, the N170 component
was delayed but enhanced for both inverted faces and bodies
(Stekelenburg and de Gelder, 2004). In the fMRI domain, both body-
and body parts-specific areas have been identified in the FG, between
face sensitive clusters in the FBA, and in the lateral occipital cortex,
termed EBA (Downing et al., 2001; Peelen and Downing, 2007).
In the context of higher-order perception in social cognitive pro-
cesses, such as interacting with unknown others for whom no relevant
information is available, people rely on a variety of factors, such as
physical appearance, verbal behavior (Ames et al., 2011), as well as
subtle nonverbal behavior, or affective body language (de Gelder et al.,
2010), as cues to form an impression. Moreover, recent studies show
that the neural network engaged during dynamic whole body percep-
tion and interaction involves the AMY, FG, pSTS, and the mPFC (Dolcos
et al., 2012; Katsumi and Dolcos, 2018). During these interactions, in-
dividuals might perceive and respond to cues that indicate approach and
avoidance motivations, namely, to seek out a given object or activity, or
to escape from the object or activity, respectively (Braver et al., 2014;
Elliot et al., 2013). A recent model proposes that there are dynamic
interactions between bottom-up signals (facial, vocal, and bodily cues)
and top-down factors (stereotypes and prior knowledge) that lead to
unified perceptions and responses to others (Freeman and Ambady,
2011). The kinds of information processed in the model include cue
level inputs (i.e., face, body, and voice cues), category level factors (i.e.,
sex, race, age, emotion), stereotypes level factors, and high level cog-
nitive states, highlighting the interactions that can occur among these
factors.
Open questions also remain in several key aspects in the area of
emotion-attention-perception interactions, where additional research is
needed to clarify these phenomena and their neural correlates. For
example, future research is needed to clarify the link between AMY
engagement and the early time course for the processing of emotional
stimuli under conditions of conscious and unconscious viewing, and the
types of emotional stimuli that can be processed without awareness.
Additional research should also target the extent to which attentional
load modulates neural activation in subcortical regions supporting
processing of salient information, such as reward. Finally, further re-
search is needed to elucidate the interactions of the complex number of
factors that influence social cognition/evaluation, to refine emerging
models and the implications for conditions where social-emotional
functioning is impaired, such as autism and social phobia (Gilboa-
Schechtman et al., 1999; Mazefsky et al., 2012).
7.2. Emotion-attention interactions in learning and memory
Evidence also highlights emotion-attention interactions in short-
and long-term forms of memory, linked to working and episodic
memory. The former closely relates to selective attention processes and,
in the context of affective WM, available evidence points to reliable
neural recruitment of the VAS, although the behavioral effects are more
mixed. In the context of emotional distraction and WM, studies in-
vestigating the neural correlates of the basic response to emotional
distraction point to an interplay between two major neural systems:
VAS, associated with emotional processing, showing increased activity,
and DES, associated with executive processing, showing decreased ac-
tivity (Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006). The impact of task-irrelevant
emotional distraction is largely supported by bottom-up mechanisms
that may redirect processing resources away from the main cognitive
task and toward stimuli with enhanced relevance for survival.
In the context of longer-lasting effects following emotion-attention
interactions, such as emotional episodic memory, the available evi-
dence supports the notion that arousal and valence effects can be dis-
sociated in the neural correlates of the memory-enhancing effect of
emotion. Specifically, the MTL-based memory mechanism is relatively
more involved in arousal-dependent effects, while the valence-related
effects are linked to connectivity of these regions within the MTL as
well as with regions such as the PFC and other cortical areas (e.g.,
parietal) (Dolcos et al., 2004a; Kensinger and Schacter, 2006). The
latter appear to be relatively more sensitive to processing of valence
and engage in higher order processes (e.g., semantic and WM, attention,
cognitive control, and self-referential processing). Furthermore, ERP
encoding results suggest that, under limited capacity for neural
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representations (Bundesen et al., 2005), the set of processes involved in
memory encoding prioritizes resources towards emotionally arousing
and relevant information, at the cost of neutral non-relevant informa-
tion (Watts et al., 2014; see for a review Mather and Sutherland, 2011).
In turn, this leads to better memory formation for both emotional items
and their associated source information. The response to acute stressors
also interacts with processes such as attention, learning, and memory.
Acute stress quickly promotes hypervigilance states via the activation of
the salience network (Hermans et al., 2014) that entails the co-activa-
tion of the AMY, the dorsal ACC, hypothalamus, the anterior insula, the
striatum, the thalamus and inferotemporal and temporoparietal regions
(Corbetta et al., 2008), but the network downregulates with the passing
of time, reducing the sustained attention back to normal levels. Delayed
effects of stress modulators, such as genomic glucocorticoids, appear to
play an important role in adapting response (Hermans et al., 2014;
Joëls et al., 2011).
Open questions in the area of emotion-attention interactions in
learning and memory also exist. For instance, future research is needed
to clarify the association between affective WM paradigms used in the
laboratory and affective WM capacity in real world environments (e.g.,
Pe et al., 2013a). It is also unclear the link between the immediate and
long-term effects in the impact of emotional distraction on working and
episodic memory respectively. Finally, additional research is also
needed to further probe the interaction of the catecholamines and
glucocorticoids that mediate both initial and subsequent stages of
processing influencing learning and memory, through pharmacological
interventions or new neuro-stimulation methods (transcutaneous vagal
nerve stimulation, Van Leusden et al., 2015; Ventura-Bort et al., 2018).
7.3. Individual differences in emotion-attention interactions
It is also important to consider the various ways in which individual
differences (sex, developmental, personality) can modulate emotion-
attention interactions in both healthy functioning and clinical condi-
tions. For example, evidence highlights differential sensitivity to basic
affective properties across the lifespan and between females and males.
Although females generally exhibit enhanced emotional competence in
emotion processing, compared to males, they are also more likely to
show a negative affective bias in attention and perception, enhanced
emotional distractibility and memory, as well as differential engage-
ment and lateralization of the AMY during emotional memory encoding
and consolidation. Developmentally, whereas children tend to show
greater interference by emotional distracters compared to adolescents
and adults, and enhanced memory for emotional compared to neutral
events (Somerville et al., 2011; Tottenham et al., 2011), older adults
tend to show reduced distraction by negative emotional stimuli and
greater susceptibility to the memory trade-off effect between emo-
tional/central vs. non-emotional/peripheral aspects of an event, com-
pared to young adults (Kensinger et al., 2007; Mather, 2012). At the
neural level, children tend to show greater AMY activation along with
more wide-spread activation during the encoding of emotional in-
formation (Nelson et al., 2003; Vasa et al., 2011). Older adults tend to
show decreased AMY response to negative stimuli and increased AMY
response to positive stimuli, along with increased engagement of the
PFC and ACC regions during the encoding of negative vs. neutral and
positive vs. negative stimuli (Dolcos et al., 2014; Mather et al., 2004;
Nashiro et al., 2012; St Jacques et al., 2010).
Personality differences, such as trait anxiety and depression, also
appear to play a role in the interaction between emotion and selective
attention and control processes. For example, across a range of selective
attention measures, anxious individuals show increased distractibility
by task-irrelevant stimuli, suggesting impaired inhibition ability (e.g.,
Berggren and Derakshan, 2013b, 2014; Moser et al., 2012). Further-
more, attentional control is disrupted in high anxiety, while emotional
processing appears to be enhanced, particularly in relation to threat. In
the case of depression, emotional interactions with attention appear to
more generally encompass attentional biases to negative information
than the relatively threat-specific idiosyncrasies of anxiety. Neu-
roscientific evidence targeting anxiety and depression suggest a trade-
off between the engagement of prefrontal brain regions associated with
attentional control versus relatively enhanced response within the
limbic network related to negative stimuli (e.g., Davidson et al., 2002).
Prolonged or chronic alterations in affective and cognitive proces-
sing are commonly observed as symptoms of affective conditions (e.g.,
anxiety, depression, and PTSD), often reflected in altered emotional
reactivity and recollection of emotional memories, along with impaired
cognitive/executive control (Rauch et al., 2006; Shin and Liberzon,
2009). In the case of anxiety, findings indicate that alterations in at-
tentional processes to emotion (i.e., threat-related stimuli) may have
early-developing neural underpinnings. In the case of depression,
findings suggest that individuals with depression or at familial risk of
depression exhibit attentional biases toward negative emotion in-
formation (e.g., sad faces) and away from positive emotional informa-
tion, and such responses seem to also be associated with alterations in
fronto-limbic systems. Regarding PTSD, emotion regulation deficits are
commonly observed (e.g., Ehring and Quack, 2010; Powers et al., 2015)
and emotion regulation capacity predicts the onset and maintenance of
post-traumatic stress symptoms following trauma (Jenness et al., 2016;
Punamäki et al., 2015). Finally, available evidence from investigations
of PTSD also points to chronic general and specific emotional and
cognitive disturbances that are linked to alterations in the neural re-
sponses underlying emotion-cognition interactions, and specifically
linked to attention. In particular, evidence suggests that reduction of
AMY and HC signals for trauma-related cues may underlie non-specific
encoding of gist-based representations instead of specific and detailed
contextual details of the trauma-related memories. This, in turn, may be
linked to symptoms of hypervigilance and non-specific responses to
trauma-related distraction, which contribute to the maintenance of a
hyperarousal state.
A number of open questions also emerge in the area of individual
differences in emotion-attention interactions. For example, future re-
search is needed to clarify whether evidence of reduced attentional
control in anxiety can explain why these individuals also show en-
hanced biases to threat-related information, and the extent to which
attentional control training can reduce anxious symptomatology.
Additionally, future research is needed with longitudinal designs to
determine how fronto-limbic systems supporting interactions between
attention and emotion develop, and whether alterations in the devel-
opment of these systems could contribute to the onset and maintenance
of anxiety and depression.
7.4. Training and interventions to optimize emotion-attention interactions
Available and emerging research findings also highlight various
ways in which attentional control, WM, and emotion regulation can be
engaged or trained in intervention approaches. For example, common
emotion regulation processes range from attentional control to cogni-
tive change. The former refers to attention selection toward or away
from affective information depending on its motivational properties,
and the later encompasses the application of higher cognitive abilities
including WM and long-term memory to emotion regulatory processes.
Interestingly, both explicit and implicit emotion regulation appear to
vary as a function of individual differences in executive control capa-
city. The neural correlates of successful emotion regulation include the
lateral/medial PFC and dorsal ACC for implicit emotion regulation.
Another form of intervention is executive control training, which
can refer to training involving cognitive processes such as WM and
selective attention, necessary for controlling behavior. For example,
attentional control and WM training has been a strategy for improving
emotion-attention interactions in the context of anxiety. The idea that
attentional control can have a causal role to play in vulnerability to
emotional disorders like anxiety and depression has received
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substantial support in a number of clinical (see Keshavan et al., 2014;
Motter et al., 2016, for reviews) and educational (Holmes and
Gathercole, 2014) domains. Additionally, evidence consistently shows
that levels of engagement with the training, and improvement on the
training task, correlates with reductions in emotional vulnerability
(e.g., Grol et al., 2018; Hotton et al., 2018). Importantly, a recent re-
view of different cognitive control trainings by Koster et al. (2017)
concluded that, depending on the fit between type of training and di-
agnosis, training can (or cannot) improve emotion control and alleviate
maladaptive emotional reactions among healthy controls and in-
dividuals diagnosed with depression. Attentional deployment strate-
gies, such as FA, have also begun to be integrated into intervention
approaches. Such strategies seem to have beneficial effects on encoding
and retrieval of emotional memories, because they can enhance the
emotional impact of positive memories and reduce the impact of ne-
gative ones. These effects appear to be associated with differential re-
cruitment and connectivity among PFC (lateral and medial) and MTL
(AMY and HC) regions. Other novel interventions targeting regulatory
focus (Strauman et al., 2015) and combining state-of-the-art brain
imaging methods, such as fMRI-guided neuronavigation, to in-
dividualize repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation treatment for
depression (Luber et al., 2017), are also helping translate brain imaging
findings to improve therapeutic efficacy.
Importantly, much of the research on training and interventions
highlighted here has been very recent, and hence there are still several
key areas for further research. As with other training domains, while
there is important promise of the effectiveness in influencing emotional
vulnerability, the field is still in its early stages and needs to grow to
accommodate more precise and tailored training regimens for max-
imum benefits. For instance, future research is needed to further clarify
the association between explicit emotion regulation and executive
control, in general, and WM, in particular. Additional research is also
needed to further elucidate the effectiveness of cognitive training
techniques in clinical settings.
7.5. Linguistic integrations
Notably, core aspects of emotion-attention interactions that emerge
throughout the literature highlighted in this review are integrated with
the terms identified by the linguistic analysis of words people use to
convey feelings related to attention. Although the term “emotion” is
often used in a broad way referring to a range of affective constructs,
there are also specific and related aspects that can be differentiated
when examining the terms describing feelings related to attention. For
example, valence and arousal emerge as affective qualities that clearly
influence attention and are evident in the identified terms. These di-
mensions can be seen in terms ranging from negative valence, low
arousal categories, such as inattentive, to positive valence, high arousal
categories such as alert/attentive and engrossed. Indeed, arousal and
valence play an important role in emotion-attention interactions in the
context of perception as well as in learning and memory, as shown by
the extensive literature that has used stimuli such as emotion-eliciting
images that are carefully controlled to be highly arousing and highly
negative in valence (e.g., Lang et al., 2008). Motivation also emerges as
an aspect that is related to processes involving reward and social cog-
nition, and is highlighted by word categories relating to concepts in-
cluding social attentiveness. For example, the literature on emotion-
attention interactions in the context of higher-order social cognition
points to processes in which individuals form impressions which could
be influenced by social attentiveness (e.g., chivalrous). Additionally,
attentional processes are highlighted by word meanings such as atten-
tive, conscious awareness, fascinated, and focused on inner thoughts.
Moreover, maladaptive emotion-attention interactions can be symp-
toms of affective disorders (e.g., preoccupied, pensive/ruminative),
whereas training adaptive emotion-attention interactions is often a
strategy for increasing resilience against, or decreasing symptoms of,
affective disorders (e.g., mindful, meditative).
In sum, we have reviewed current research and emerging directions
in emotion-attention interactions, focusing on the associated neural
mechanisms as revealed by functional brain imaging and physiological
investigations. Such a comprehensive approach allowed for an in-
tegrative overview of the available evidence regarding the mechanisms
of emotion-attention interactions and highlighted emerging directions
for future investigations. As the field continues to address these issues,
new findings will help to better clarify the dynamics and neural cor-
relates of emotion-attention interactions and inform new and compre-
hensive models of the related psychological phenomena and brain
functions. Overall, emerging and future research in these areas will
continue refining our understanding of the effective practices and as-
sociated neural mechanisms, in order to better promote and maintain
well-being.
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